...,1st Draft

Chapter 2 – Training and Deployment for OIF 101 Feb

Part 2: OIF 1, 2003, The Push, Baghdad, Karbala

Chapter 2: Training and Deployment

41 59’28.5” N 88 05’3.3 W elev 240 meters Belvedere, Illinois

Local GMT 20 December 2000

LINK

Yeah right, there’s no way that you can do that. Peter Milinkovic’s buddies thought there was no way he could go into the Marine Corps when he told them. He had been attracted by Marine recruiting commercials, which struck a cord with Peter. His father was asking him what he was going to do. He grew up playing video games like Final Fantasy, SOCOM, and playing football. Years later, after 3 tours in Iraq, he found that the video games were actually pretty good training.

After he cracked the growth plate in his foot, they told him that he’d never play again. After graduating from boot camp and serving in Iraq, he thought, it appears that the growth plate in my foot is just fine.

Peter Milinkovic grew up in the middle class suburb of Belvedere, Illinois, about 45 minutes outside of Chicago. It was a small, close knit community that saw a significant growth spurt after Wal-mart moved in. He graduated high school and started Marine Boot Camp in the same year, 2001. He found boot camp to be a culture shock. It doesn’t matter if you father is a millionaire, or if you’re homeless – everyone is the same at Boot Camp. It’s all about camaraderie and team work. He dealt with the stress of Boot Camp by thinking, “these guys are just doing their job.”

At School of Infantry, he learned Marine Corps weapons systems, then how to patrol, move at night, and started to develop combat endurance. Everything that he learned there formed the foundation – the base of the pyramid. When he arrived at Lima 3/7, he immediately was picked for “Super Squad” as a Private First Class – a key formative experience. The intense training and camaraderie developed during Super Squad taught PFC Milinkovic “everything that I know.” Sgt Wilder, a Black Belt, and the squad leader during Super Squad was a crucial individual in shaping Peter Milinkovic’s expertise as an infantry leader. UCAX, at Victorville three months before OIF 1, was some of the best training that he did as a young Marine.

UCAX — Urban Combined Arms Exercise — was part of 3/7’s pre-deployment training, conducted in late July to early August 2002. By the summer of 2002, the steady march towards war with Iraq had already started. The 1st Marine Expeditionary Force (1MEF), headquartered at Camp Pendleton, would play a major role. 1 MEF had been the major Marine formation that attacked into Kuwait in 1991. Now, 1 MEF was again expecting to play a major role in a possible invasion of Iraq. A MEF is the largest of what the Marines call a Marine Air Ground Task Force — or MAG-TF (pronounced MAG-Taff, in Marine terminology). A MAGTF consists of 4 elements, including a Ground Combat Element or GCE, and a command-, air-, and logistics element. The ground combat element of 1 MEF would be 1st Marine Division (1MARDIV), also headquartered at Camp Pendleton. The Division consisted of 3 Infantry Regiments — 1st, 5th, and 7th Marines — an artillery regiment, 11th Marines, as well as “independent” battalions of tanks, recon, engineers and armored amphibious vehicles (“Amtracs”). 7th Marine Regiment — commonly known as 7th Marines — in turn consisted of 4 Infantry Battalions: 1st Battalion, 7th Marines (1/7), 2/7, 3/7, and 3d Battalion, 4th Marines (3/4). 3/7 consisted of 3 Rifle Companies of 180 Marines, a Weapons Company, and a Headquarters Company. Lima 3/7 was one of the 3 Rifle Companies in 3/7. Like all Rifle Companies, Lima consisted of 3 Rifle Platoons, a Weapons Platoon, and a small headquarters platoon. Each Rifle Platoon consisted of 3 Infantry Squads, which in turn consisted of three 4-Marine Fire Teams, lead by an NCO — usually a Sergeant (E-5) or Corporal (E-4).

In July and August of 2002, 3/7 participated in the UCAX which Peter Milinkovic remembers as one of the best training experiences prior to deployment to Iraq, along with Millenium Dragon 02, which was part of the larger, Millenium Challenge 02 exercise.

PFC (E-2) Peter Milinkovic recalls the build up to war as a member of one of those fire teams far down on the chain of command. The Marine Corps, though, puts great emphasis on the quality of its junior enlisted and officer leadership — the Sergeants and Corporals, 2nd Lieutenants (O-1), 1st Lieutenants (0-2), and Captains (0-3) who make tactical decisions. In this culture which emphasizes small unit combat skills, Sergeant Wilder’s status as Super Squad leader distinguished him from other infantry NCOs. The Super Squad competition is held at the Company-, Battalion-, Regimental-, and finally Division-level. For Link to be chosen as a member of Super Squad indicated his potential as an infantry Marine, and he benefited from the superior knowledge and leadership of Wilder.

PFC Milinkovic liked UCAX, singling it out as one of the best parts of his pre-deployment training, probably because that particular training was a 96-hour program supported by simulated small arms (paint balls fired from weapons like the Marines own rifles and pistols) and laser gear. For a kid who grew up playing football and the video game, SOCOM, there is nothing better than real projectiles which sting and leave a visible paint mark to train for combat. Together with the UCAX, 3/7 also participated in exercise Millenium Dragon 02, which was the Marine component of the Joint Forces experiment, Millennium Challenge, which was notable for the success of the Opposing Force, lead by retired Marine General Paul Van Riper, whose guerrilla tactics foreshadowed the actual challenges which lay ahead in Iraq. Van Riper confounded the exercise force by using motorcycle messengers and small suicide boats when they were unexpected. A hero of Vietnam (who had commanded a company in 3/7, and whose Marine Officer son also served in 3/7), Van Riper quit the exercise in protest when the drill was reset.

Like most Marine Battalions, 3/7 followed a building block approach to training for combat, beginning with the lowest level of organization — the 4-Man Fire Team — and working up to the 1200-Man Battalion. In April through May, 2002, 3/7 developed a core of urban warfare instructors by sending about 90 Marines to a Division-level course at Camp Pendleton. This was the first phase of a progressive urban warfare package developed by the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab (MCWL), which was headquartered at Quantico, Virginia, but which had a team with the 1st Marine Division in California.

The second phase of the MCWL urban skills package incorporated not just 3/7 but also a platoon of Amtracs (14 vehicles, each of which could carry at least a squad of 13 Marines), a platoon of tanks (4 M1-A1 tanks), and a platoon of combat engineers. This three week package — conducted in June and July, 2002 — gave the leaders of the Fire Team, Squad (13 Marines), Platoon (42 Marines), and Company (180 Marines) extensive experience in what the Marines call “combined arms.” The Marines define combined arms as using one weapon to make an enemy vulnerable to another weapon. A Marine Rifle Company itself has rifles, light machine guns, and grenade launchers in its 3 Rifle Platoons, as well as medium machine guns, rockets, and light mortars in its single weapons platoon. A single Rifle Company can “mech up” in a platoon of 14 Amtracs — that is, the Rifle Company will break down into squads and each squad will ride in a single Amtrac. A Company “team” is formed when a platoon of 4 Tanks is attached to the Company, and 3 Amtracs with a Rifle Platoon is detached, usually to a Tank Company. During the urban skills training package run by MCWL, Lima 3/7 would have practiced using not only its organic weapons, but also using the considerable firepower of a tank (a 120mm main gun, 2 medium machine guns, and a heavy machine gun) and an Amtrac (two heavy machine guns).

BELLMONT

December 2001. Marines are bad asses, they are the best. That’s what Kurt Bellmont always heard. After graduating from high school in the Class of 2000, he was working in his hometown of Cold Springs, Minnesota. After 9-11, it was eating at him that he wasn’t doing his share. He didn’t know anything about the military or military service. So he walked into a recruiter’s station.

Kurt Bellmont came from a small town with a population of 3000. His high school class was a mixture of kids from 3 nearby towns. Everyone in the town knew everyone else. Everyone knows when he is coming back from Iraq. Everyone makes a big deal of it. His parents are still together after 28 years of marriage, and he has 3 older siblings. He was always involved in sports when he was growing up.

When he was a kid, Kurt was always suffering minor injuries from climbing trees. He was not a TV buff as a kid. He preferred to go outside, playing in the woods. With his friends, he would shoot BB guns at animals and each other. He had a few very close friends growing up. He would sneak outside and try not to get caught. He was always comfortable in the outdoors. He never held a job when he just had to sit in an office and answer a phone. His first real job was working at a stable at a ranch, where his parents started camping when he was 2 years old. He got along very well with the owners and their kids. He worked there on and off until age 19 or 20. He delivered pizzas, which was the closest he came to a normal job. He worked on sewer and water construction, and advanced through the ranks pretty quickly, always catching on quickly. His uncle had the same job, and Kurt did not want to do this job until he was 40, so he joined the Marine Corps.

Kurt was always above average, particularly in sports. As a 5 year old he learned to water ski. By the age of 7, he was slaloming on one leg. He dove in high school. His coach hated him because he would learn 4 new dives in a day, and, having learned all the dives moved on.

Regarding boot camp, he notes, “I took it pretty easy. I was 20 when I went in. When the drill instructor said, ‘I am only doing my job,’ a light went on. Then I found out they have to feed us, they have to give us 8 hours of sleep, it wasn’t that bad. They always left me alone. I only got IP (individual punishment) twice – once for my rack mate, and once for itching my nose at midnight in front of the chow hall. I owned up to it, and the punishment was fast.”

On the topic of School of Infantry, which follows the 13-week boot camp for Marines who are chosen for the Infantry Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) he says, “It should be at 29 Palms, not Camp Pendleton, because there are better live fire opportunities out here. Sometimes we threw rocks for grenades at Camp Pendleton – it was ridiculous. You need live rounds at that stage of your career.”

In School of Infantry, Kurt Bellmont passed the Recon indoctrination test, which is required to start training as an elite, reconnaissance Marine. However, he fractured his shin on a range run. He did go to amphibious recon school in Virginia with his fractured leg. Of that experience he notes, “I got book knowledge, the knots and other techniques, which I use to this day. That was my favorite time in the Marine Corps – that one month stint.”

Kurt Bellmont found that he loved his job as an infantryman because he was always doing something different every day. In all of the other specialties in the Marines, people sit at a desk and do the same thing every day. In the infantry, he found that he was always doing something different. He liked the variety. He hated monotony.

Along with Peter Milinkovic, Kurt Bellmont was one of the original Marines who made up 3d Platoon, Lima Company, 3/7, as it prepared for war in the Summer and Fall of 2002.

MEJIA

Jose Mejia was raised in the Southern portion of the city of San Antonio, Texas. “It was pretty rough” was his description of this early neighborhood. Most of his elementary classmates were affiliated with one local gang or another. Living only five minute from his elementary school, Mejia’s mother would walk him home. “Mom was protective” was Mejia’s earliest memories of his mother, but it was his older sister that was his greatest influence during this otherwise critical time in a young boy’s life. Only one year older and a grade ahead of Mejia, his sister would be his active conscience and was responsible for steering him away from an otherwise destructive lifestyle. She would say things like “you’re dumb for doing that kind of stuff” or “you’re stupid for hanging around those kids.” But it wasn’t until his first year of middle school that he finally walked away from “those kids” and joined – what Mejia described as – “the jocks.” “She helped me out a lot coming up…making decisions in my life and stuff like that” Mejia said of his sister’s love for him and his respect to her as a mentor.

Raised in a large family – four brothers and four sisters – Mejia was the fifth child. “My father worked in a butcher house and my mom didn’t work…so dad would work for the family” was Mejia’s inception into a family of brothers and sisters that pulled resources together to support their household. “The boys would work during the summers” which was the norm for the Mejia family youngsters. “I would help out with mom when I was working during the summers. I would take her shopping for groceries and would randomly surprise her when I would take her to the mall to buy her stuff.” His mother would refuse, but in the end Mejia would buy these things – which he felt she was denied because she put her family first.

Mejia was first introduced to the workforce when he began working construction at age 8 or 9 as an assistant to his uncle. “I liked it…growing up and working construction, and did so until I was 18.” Working every summer as well as during breaks like Christmas, Spring Break, Easter and others to make a little extra money was the custom. “My mother was very supportive of me and so I would take her out to eat…just her and I,” which he hid from the rest of the family.

Besides being an accomplished athlete, Mejia was also what the current generation calls “a gamer” – for those who actively play computer and console video games. In addition to offering his earnings to his family he also used part of his wages to collect gaming systems as a young man. An important aspect of Mejia’s military career is his participation in what the Armed Forces call TDG’s (Tactical Decision Games). “That was my TDG’s [the first-person shooter video games] as far as growing up…now I’m realizing that those games were making me perfect for the military.” Mejia correlates the first-person shooter tactical games that he played as a child with his success as an infantry squad leader. It taught Mejia to think through four dimensional “real world” combat situations. Learning to break into the digital opponents’ decision making loop taught Mejia how to employ his unit’s weapons to beat an enemy with military assets long before he joined the Marine Corps. “It’s helping me out with my Marine Corps career, for the moment…it’s pretty cool” was Mejia impression of these games on his present success in Iraq as a combat leader. At the time of this writing, Mejia was deployed to four seven month deployments – three of which were combat deployments where he suffered no combat related injuries, which Mejia feels in part were due to the experience he gained from these games.

Academically, Mejia was what he called “a geek in math” and helped his older sister in her algebra studies. Mejia graduated from high school achieving pre-calculus as his highest level of the mathematics. He centered his studies in the sciences – chemistry and biology – and made B’s and C’s, but he never put his heart into his classes.

However, Mejia’s true passion was playing sports. He played four years of varsity football as a “Bob Cat” for South Sands high school. Mejia was a linebacker, defensive end, tight end, and played positions on offense when called upon. Also, Mejia participated in track, which was required by his football coach to improve the football players’ run times on the playing field.

Mejia was drawn to military service because of an early memory of a veteran’s memorial service that he attended where his uncle was wearing white gloves and a black service coat. He never knew which service his uncle was in but was honored that he was a combat veteran. Mejia recalls the final selling point before joining the Marine Corps: “I joined the Marine Corps for the challenge. I joined the infantry after I asked my recruiter what I needed to do to fire every single weapon, [at which point] he suggested that I become a Grunt…I laughed.” Mejia shipped out to recruit training eleven days after 9-11. His parents, who were not aware that their fifth child had joined the Marine Corps, were surprised when they were first informed by the recruiter as Mejia was packing his luggage for his shipment to recruit training. “I said goodbye to my parents at the swimming pool of a Double Tree hotel the night before I left.” That was the last time Mejia spoke to his parents as a civilian.

Mejia, Link, and Bellmont all started their Marine careers in 3d Platoon, Lima 3/7 in 2002.

38 15’20.7” N 119 13’43.32 W elev 1973 meters
Local GMT 14 April 2002

CARPENTER

It has been said that history is the religion of the Marine Corps. So it is perhaps fitting that much of this tale was recorded in interviews. For example, on the Marine Birthday, 10 November 2007, Author Doug Halepaska celebrated the High Holiday with a lengthy interview with Matt Carpenter at a Marine Base in Ramadi, Iraq. Both were alumni of Lima Company, but Carpenter had served with the Rifle Company through 2 combat tours. The culture of the Marine Corps has been described as a warrior culture, with an oral tradition, comparable to Scots-Irish culture. Indeed, writers like Jim Webb have made this comparison overt in books like Born Fighting. As the Corps celebrated another birthday with Marines in a Small War, Carpenter recounted his first encounter with the Company and Battalion that would become his home for 5 tours…

In April 2002, Staff Sergeant Carpenter, USMC, had a problem. There was a war coming, everyone knew it. He had to find a way to get into the fight. But he was stuck at Bridgeport, the Marine Corps’ Mountain Warfare training center, located 40 miles Northeast of the Yosemite Valley, high in the Sierra mountain range. He was too early in his tour at Bridgeport for a new billet. He had an opportunity to do a prestigious exchange tour with the Royal Marines in England, a slot reserved only for the best American Marines who maintained a kinship with their British counterpart Marine brethren. But Carpenter had another goal in mind — he wanted to become a Marine Gunner, a warrant officer who specializes in Marine infantry weapons. The Royal Marine tour would not help him towards becoming a Marine Gunner. To become a Marine Gunner would require more experience in a Weapons Company of an Infantry Battalion. With a war an increasing likelihood, Carpenter set his sights on an immediate target: getting into a Weapons Company in an Infantry Battalion in time for the Iraq fight.

The weather was getting better. Spring was coming. Snow was still on the high peaks that surrounded the Marine high mountain warfare base. But it was already getting warmer. Marine Battalion 3/7 had scheduled a training package up at Bridgeport in April 2002. Carpenter and his fellow instructors looked on the Battalion and noted the improving weather. This was not the most challenging of environments, but still, the high-altitude hiking and small unit exercises would be excellent for developing unit cohesion and leadership at every level. Carpenter saw many Marine Battalions come through Bridgeport, but he liked what he saw in 3/7, and in Lima Company, commanded by Captain Monte, in particular. 3/7 was a good unit, and Lima was a solid Rifle Company. But another feature of Battalion 3/7 caught his eye too — the Battalion was light on Staff NCOs. Carpenter started developing a game plan to get into an Infantry Battalion in time for the coming war.

In 3d Platoon, Lima 3/7, Link, Bellmont, and Mejia were serving in junior enlisted billets at the rank of Private First Class (PFC, E-2) or Lance Corporal (E-3). They went through the Bridgeport package in April 2002 as SAW Gunners or Fire Team Leaders who took their commands from Squad Leaders, Platoon Sergeants and Platoon Commanders who had between 2 and 10 years of experience in the Fleet Marine Force.

Staff Sergeant Carpenter was what he called, “A Second Marine Division hand” prior to his joining with Lima Company 3/7. Above all, he aspired to become a Marine Gunner. Marine Gunners are warrant officers who specialize in the Infantry Weapons which are central to all aspects of Marine ground operations. In the insular priesthood of the Marine Corps, Gunners are the Deacons who are held in universally high regard by all ranks, from Private to General. Generals have been known to defer to Gunners on matters beyond simply weapons employment.

Since the Marine Corps is such a small service, it has only three active divisions plus one reserve division. Many Marines vigorously identify with the division with whom they first served. Generally infantry Marines, after completing their initial service training (13 weeks of recruit training plus eight weeks of basic Marine Corps infantry schooling) are assigned to one of these divisions — but many of these new Marines simply call it “The Fleet,” short for the Fleet Marine Force or FMF. The Second Marine Division, or simply 2MarDiv, is based at Camp LeJeune, which is nestled along the coastal marshlands of North Carolina. “I spent eight years at LeJeune with 1/8 and 2/8 and I honestly thought [at that time] that the sun rose and set on the Second Marine Division’s ass,” was Carpenter’s views of his service with his first division.

A career infantry Marine, Carpenter was required to complete what is known as a B-billet assignment if he were to remain eligible for further reenlistments. This new assignment took him and his family across the country to the Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Training Center (MCMWTC). Located just 21 miles northwest of Bridgeport, California, this mountain training center is known as just “Bridgeport” to the rest of the Marine Corps. The full names are usually found only on assignment orders and signs found outside of these bases.

“I first arrived at Bridgeport in 2000 for a three year obligation as a mountain leader course instructor, which was during 9-11 and all of that. At the time I was a Staff Sergeant (SSgt) instructor up there, and I think at that time Afghanistan was at full swing. I believe that everyone in the Marine Corps knew that we were going to expand past Afghanistan, potentially into Iraq within the next few months at that point,” said Carpenter, expressing a concern that he would not be involved in this coming war.

Bridgeport was a challenging duty station. At an altitude of 6000 feet or more, with regular snow, and with the only active mule packing course in the entire Department of Defense, the Marines’ mountain warfare center was designed to train “Mountain Leaders.” These Mountain Leaders would, in turn, train their units upon return from the course. The Marines had found that the same survival skills which helped small groups of mountaineers survive at altitude also kept teams together in combat. Therefore, the course served the dual purpose of developing mountaineering, rappelling, and rope skills while also building solid small unit leaders.

Prior to 9-11 Carpenter had shown an interest and the expertise to be considered for the “British Royal Marines Exchange Program.” He was later selected to go to that program. This was a two-year opportunity for him and his family to travel and live in England. However, with the war on the horizon he turned his efforts to join an infantry battalion.

“Bridgeport was what the Corps called a ‘hot fill’, which traditionally is a post that is difficult to fill with staff noncommissioned officers (SNCO),” explained Carpenter. As a result, he found it difficult to join a combat unit. Since he had only completed his first two years of a three-year obligation the Marine Corps personnel system was not ready to let him rotate back to an infantry unit.

Carpenter’s concerns about joining an infantry unit started to fade in the Spring of 2002 when he first came across 3/7, which was scheduled for an abbreviated training package at Bridgeport. Looking over the ranks of 3/7 he noticed a curious thing — there were few senior enlisted Marines. “I remember as an instructor and taking a look at the unit…realizing very quickly that they were extremely short handed with Staff NCO’s,” recalled Carpenter. He viewed 3/7 as his “ace-in-the hole” for getting out of Bridgeport and back to the Fleet.

“So I’m looking at these guys and thinking that they seem to be pretty fucking sharp, especially the Lima Marines”, was Carpenter’s earliest memories of the battalion that would soon be his home for the next six years. Ironically, Lima Company was at that time commanded by a Marine officer by the name of Captain Mike Monti who served with Carpenter back in the 1990’s — Alpha Company 1/8. Carpenter and Monti were good friends who deployed together to Okinawa, Japan and attended Army Ranger School and Jump School together back in 1995. They had not seen each other in a long time and made it a point to sit down and talk before the end of the Bridgeport training cycle.

At the luncheon Carpenter and Monte discussed the differences between 8th and 7th Marines, and the superior training ranges that existed at 29 Palms compared to the ranges – and in many ways more restrictive ranges – at Camp LeJeune. (The term “range” is used as a description of a weapons firing range that can be as small as a pistol range or as large as one that measures for many miles and can tolerate maneuvering armored vehicles, impacting artillery, supporting attack aircraft, and infantry in a single firing exercise) “So we’re reminiscing about old times and I’m asking him about 7th Marines,” was Carpenter’s question to his old platoon commander. “Yeah, 3/7 is awesome and 29 Palms is awesome” was Capt Monti’s answer to Carpenter’s general question. Setting the gears in motion for Carpenter’s plan to get back into the fleet he sat down with his wife that night to explain his intentions. A family man, Carpenter has seven children and had to consider the welfare of his family in any career decisions.

29 Palms — or just the Stumps — is the name used by all Marines to describe what the Marine Corps officially titles, the “Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center (MCAGCC).” Like the city of Bridgeport that gives the Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Training Center its common name, so the small town of 29 Palms, California has come to stand for MCAGCC. The Stumps is located in the center of the Mojave Desert and is 55 miles from the desert golf resort of Palm Springs, California. Every Marine Corps infantry battalion rotates through a one-month desert training exercise every two years. These temporary residents of the Stumps see only the primitive living conditions of the training facilities and ranges located near an expeditionary air field, and therefore a negative impression has formed throughout the Marine Corps about being stationed at the Stumps. 7th Marines is stationed at the Stumps and therefore the Regiment can heavily use the training ranges that Capt Monti described to Carpenter.

“This set the gears in motion for me to see 7th Marines as a viable option,” recalled Carpenter about his plan to get back into the Fleet. If he was going to get into the fight he needed to marry-up with a combat unit. This was not going to be possible if he planned on going back to Camp LeJeune with 8th Marines, or First Marine Division (1MarDiv) at Camp Pendleton (40 miles north of San Diego). “So basically the ace-in-the hole would be to use 7th Marines. No one wants to go to 7th Marines unless they are ordered to, or knew someone who had been there before.” But Carpenter still needed to convince his career planner that it was in the Corps best interest to transfer him from Bridgeport to the Fleet.

The career planner (also known as a monitor) was not willing to let Carpenter leave Bridgeport before his three-year commitment was fulfilled – he still needed to complete an additional year at that time. “So I knew I had a hard sell ahead of me with the monitor. At first the monitor didn’t want to hear anything about me transferring early from Bridgeport, until I told him that I wanted to go to 3/7. I think his first words after hearing I wanted to go to 29 Palms were – after he picked himself up from the floor – when do you want to go? No one wants to go to 29 Palms, because every battalion rotates through there for desert training, so they only know those desolate training areas. It’s the one Marine base that the average bear doesn’t want to go,” said Carpenter. Two months later he had his orders for 29 Palms.

A long-term goal of Carpenter’s was to eventually become a Marine Corps Gunner – not to be mistaken with the gunnery sergeant – which is a warrant officer billet. This highly respected and sought after billet are the weapons experts of the infantry battalions. Only a handful of these Gunners exist in the Marine Corps, and therefore the selection process for such a billet are very restrictive and are limited to only the most qualified of Marines. These Gunners are so respected and knowledgeable that Major General James Mattis – 1MarDiv commanding general for the invasion of Iraq – pulled then-retired Chief Warrant Officer 5 Gunner Timothy Gelinas from retirement to help implement a new weapon system that he had recently acquired in his arsenal of division weapons. General Mattis wanted this new weapon in his fight with Saddam and requested that the reactivated Gunner Gelinas fix it. What made this story so interesting, besides the reactivation of Gelinas, was that this Gunner was already a among the most experienced combat veterans in the First Marine Division. Gunner Gelinas served in Vietnam twice — including in the infamous “Hill Fights of Khe Sanh” where his company (Bravo 1/9) was almost wiped out to the man — the Gulf War in 1991, Somalia, and in 2003 with 1st Light Armored Recon (LAR) in the invasion of Iraq. Truly, Carpenter had great role models to follow in the Gunner Program.

In order for Carpenter to qualify for the Gunner program he needed to follow a narrow career path, which would eventually take him to Weapons Company. A Weapons Company has the medium mortars, heavy machine guns, and medium and heavy anti-tank missiles in an Infantry battalion. Every Gunner is required to have Weapons Company experience before he can put in a package for the Gunner program.

Prior to checking in at the Stumps, Carpenter had made arrangements through back channels, to be assigned to 3/7 Weapons Company. In recalling his plans, Carpenter notes, “The old commanding officer of 2/5, Colonel Cetinski, who was the operations officer at Bridgeport and who I worked for, was a good friend of Whiskey [Weapons] Company’s Commanding Officer, then-Captain Dan Schmidtt. So they are trying to hook me up for a Weapons Company billet.”

Feeling confident that he will be checking in with Weapons Company, Carpenter checked in with 3/7 on a late Friday afternoon. Standing before Sergeant Major Lamelin – the sergeant major of 3/7 during August 2002 – Carpenter was sure he was going to Weapons Company. As the sergeant major was looking over Carpenter’s service jacket, he made some agreeable comments to Carpenter about his exceptional service, as the sergeant major turns his chair towards the back wall. (Every marine has a service jacket or book of his/her military service records and performance evaluations) The wall was covered with placards designating all the senior enlisted billets for the battalion. As the Sergeant Major is thinking out loud, he’s contemplating Carpenter’s fate. “Let’s see, where am I sending you.”

“I think I’m going to Weapons Company,” interrupted Carpenter.

“No, definitely not Weapons Company…ah, yeah it’s Lima Company, that’s where you’re going,” explained the Sergeant Major.

In the back of Carpenter’s mind he was thinking “son of a bitch” about his bad fortune. As the Sergeant Major turned back towards Carpenter he asked him whether he knows a First Sergeant Ariane Burns? Carpenter then realizing that his finely crafted plans are then lost.

“Do you mean First Sergeant Marty Burns?” asked Carpenter.

“Yes, he’s the First Sergeant for Lima Company and he has requested that you check in with them,” were the sergeant majors final instructions to Carpenter.

Burns and Carpenter were old Bridgeport hands, and it would appear that the first sergeant of Lima Company wanted to rope in a good staff sergeant, regardless of Carpenters wishes. His plans derailed, Carpenter later described his good-humored frustration at that time as, “he screwed me, and everything is now fucked”.

Minutes after receiving this bad news, a company clerk from Lima arrived to show Carpenter to the company offices. Walking into the offices he found the Lima Company leadership being debriefed by Captain George Schreffler. In the background Carpenter saw his old Bridgeport mate, First Sergeant Burns, making pull-up gestures towards him. Still wearing his dress alpha’s (the traditional heavy dress uniform that reporting Marines wear on the first day to their new unit) Carpenter eyed Burns with a “screw you” at the thought of doing pull-ups in the August heat wearing his Alpha’s.

After the debrief Captain Schreffler motioned Carpenter to his office for the welcome aboard talk. Captain Schreffler told Carpenter that he had heard nothing but good things about him and that he wanted Carpenter to take over as his weapons platoon sergeant. The Lima Company skipper was confident about the abilities of his Weapons Marines. Schreffler felt that Weapons needed some leadership, which was why he selected Carpenter for his Company.

At that same time another staff sergeant who was also checking into 3/7 walked into the Lima office area. Being dismissed from the CO’s office Carpenter made his way over to the First Sergeants office. “As I was talking with Burns the phone rang and I could hear Sergeant Major Lamelin on the other end of the phone. The other staff sergeant was now standing outside of the First Sergeant’s office,” recalled Carpenter. The other staff sergeant was a Gunnery Sergeant select and was being offered in place of Carpenter for Lima Company. The sergeant major was going to send Carpenter to Weapons Company if the Lima CO wanted this other staff sergeant. “Finally, things are going my way”, thought Carpenter to his change of fortune. First Sergeant Burns told the Sergeant Major to wait until he first talks it over with Captain Schreffler. A few minutes later the First Sergeant returned and told the Sergeant Major over the phone, “No we got our guy.”

“I can recall hearing Lamelin over the phone saying ‘are you sure’ and Burns saying, “No we got our guy.” Thus, Carpenter’s best laid plans to get into Weapons Company and his hopes of becoming a Gunner seemed to have hit a detour.

Before leaving the company area Captain Schreffler asked Carpenter if he could have this gear ready by Tuesday. Most Marines are allowed a week to complete the checking in process. Lima Company had for weeks prior to the arrival of Carpenter been training aggressively at Range 400. In fact, 3/7 as a whole had been engaged in a heavy training schedule of urban combat, or what the military as a whole calls Military Operations Urban Terrain, but is simply called MOUT. At that time there were no urban training facilities at 29 Palms and therefore most of 3/7’s training was done off base.

Captain Scheffler had taken over from Captain Monti months prior to Carpenter’s arrival to Lima Company. Scheffler had been an instructor at Infantry Officer Course (IOC) at Quantico, Virginia. IOC is the final 3 and a half month course that a Marine Officer goes through before taking charge of a Marine Rifle Platoon. Prior to IOC, a Marine Lieutenant will have finished the 6 month Basic Officers Course (TBS) — which all Marine Officers from pilots to ground officers attend — as well as Officer Candidate School (OCS). IOC is run by a Major and about 10 Captains who instruct classes of 40 Lieutenant-Students. The high instructor to student ratio is designed to provide an intensive, hands-on learning environment. Captain-instructors box with Lieutenant-students in the “room of pain” — a package where boxing rounds are timed by the length of time it takes for other Lieutenants to complete exercises like push ups. Captain-instructors shadow Lieutenant-students on field exercises which last up to 10 days. Captain-instructors follow the Lieutenant-students through exercises on every infantry weapon in the Marine inventory, and the coordination of those ground weapons with artillery and aircraft.

Schreffler had made a powerful impression on certain IOC students, such as Dominique Neal, who also joined Lima Company as a platoon commander. One of the more challenging parts of the IOC curriculum was a night attack conducted by the platoon of Lieutenants. The platoon level attack was executed at night and under non-illuminated conditions – no flares or popup pyrotechnics.

“I think he had it in his mind that he was going to do this same kind of night attack with a company when he arrived at 29 Palms,” recalled Carpenter about Captain Schreffler’s intent for the Range 400 attack. Scheffler explained that this was why Lima had been training so hard at Range 400 for the last few weeks. He asked me what I thought about such an exercise, “I laughed because I thought he was at first joking.” The thought of 200 plus Marines running through a non illuminated night attack seemed crazy. From his experience with 8th Marines at Camp LeJeune, Carpenter thought that no unit leader would be willing to take such a risk. If any Marine were injured or killed, the death would spell the end to Captain Schreffler’s career. “When he told me this, in the back of my mind I was thinking there was no way in hell that there would be enough medical support in the entire San Bernardino county to remove all the bodies from Range 400,” thought Staff Sergeant Carpenter at that time.

 

Range 400 is a mile-deep box canyon with a series of bunker complexes spread out over a half mile in the rear of the canyon. On the left side, machine gun hill is the usual spot that Company Commanders place their medium machine guns, which are able to hit the bunkers which fall between 500 and 1000 meters away. The maximum range of a medium machine gun is 1000 meters. On the right side, tucked into some washed out draws, the Company will usually place its own light mortars, and maybe the medium mortars from the Battalion. The mortars are 1000 to 1500 meters from the targets, well within their maximum range of 3700 meters. The majority of the Infantry Company usually manuevers down he middle of the range, using high explosives to breach obstacle belts. The entire exercise is conducted with live bullets, rockets, mortar bombs and explosives.

Normally, this attack is conducted during the day. This is hard enough for most Marine Infantry units. Executing the attack at night can be done, particularly with illumination — high powered star shells from mortars which dangle in the air for 30 seconds at a time under their parachutes. These munitions cast a eerie light and the confusing shadows are sometimes difficult to navigate through. But, an illuminated night attack is just a degree of difficulty higher than a daylight attack.

A non-illuminated night attack is a different proposition altogether. The main way that each Marine would see would be night vision devices. Unit leaders would have to keep control of each of their Marines through the darkness. The Company Commander and the Platoon Commanders would still be controlling supporting arms — the machine guns and the mortars — from one target to the next as the majority of the company cleared those targets. The Marines with rockets — the infantry Marines with AT-4s and the assault rocket gunners — would be firing their projectiles from amid the bulk of the Infantry Marines. Such an exercise would demand rehearsals and practice which ensured that the least proficient Marine did not kill one of his buddies.

“I was with the mortars during the Range 400 attack, since I had been through Infantry Mortars Leader Course, that is were I was during game day. I was absolutely blown away about how the company executed the attack. People from all over the division came to see this. Division headquarters and the regiment were watching this. This was the first time that anyone had thought about doing something like this, and no one since had repeated it. It was at this time that I knew I was with the right battalion and especially with the right company if I was going to war.” said Carpenter.

In October Carpenter was ordered by the battalion to report to the Staff NCO Academy at Camp Pendleton for his career level professional education. Carpenter was going to be in the zone for possibly picking up the rank of Gunnery Sergeant. Battalion wanted to be certain that he did not lack the proper level of professional courses that might prevent him from picking up his next rank. This was a disappointment to Carpenter who was going to miss the Combined Arms Exercise (CAX), which was scheduled for October and would run into November of 2003. “We [the battalion] were possibly going to war and I was new to the unit and needed to get to know the ‘Boys’, and what better way to do that then to go to CAX. So, I missed CAX to ensure I had my career course education,” explained Carpenter.

In late October through mid November 2002, 3/7 participated in a “traditional” Combined Arms Exercise (CAX) at the battalion’s home base, 29 Palms. 7th Marines — along with one Artillery battalion, the tank battalion, and 2 Light Armored Recon (LAR) battalions — are stationed permanently at 29 Palms, while the rest of the 1st Marine Division is stationed at Camp Pendleton. Because of this peculiar fate, the Marines at 29 Palms over develop their weapons skills — while, maybe, under developing their social skills. 29 Palms Marine Base — the Corps’ biggest — is set in the high Mojave Desert with Joshua Tree National Park across one highway, and the Army National Training Center across another highway.

The traditional CAX schedule consists of 22 days, including 3 days of Platoon Attacks, 3 days of Company Attacks at the infamous Range 400 — over a mile of challenging terrain, allowing for the use of machine guns, mortars, and rockets, as well as heavier weapons — several rounds of fire support coordination exercises, and air support coordination exercises involving the competent use of artillery, mortars, and close air support.

The Company level attack at Range 400 usually starts early in the day at a simulated minefield. The company commander gives his order the previous day, and the platoon commanders in turn give their orders to their squad leaders. At each level, Marines study terrain models and brief their plans. Marines load their gear with full combat loads of ammunition. Scout Snipers attached to the company take positions high in the ridge and over watch simulated enemy bunker complexes a mile deep in the canyon. The three Rifle Platoons line up behind the point where the Company breaches the minefield, while the mortar section of three tubes prepares to fire suppression fires. When the company commander initiates the attack, a violent ballet starts. An engineer section detonates breaching charges just yards from the infantry Marines lined up behind the simulated minefield. Mortars fire in the background with the flat, metallic booms preceeding the impact of high explosive and white phosphorous rounds downrange to cover the movement of the assault platoons 30 seconds later. A machine gun section of 4 or 6 guns will run through the breach and into machine gun positions to provide long range suppressive fires while the assault platoons manuever down the canyon. Marines will hear the supersonic crack of machine gun rounds close to overhead as they run. More obstacles may be encountered, and breached with back pack rocket packs which string small balls of explosive across the wire. The assault platoons will take a series of bunkers through direct assault. The exercise is closely monitored by controllers — so-called “coyotes” from the Tactical Exercise Control Group. The assault platoons will use AT-4 anti tank rockets, as well as bunker buster rockets from the weapons platoon to hit specific bunkers. The entire violent ballet is orchestrated by squad-, platoon- and company-commanders who have only worked together for months at the most. As the platoons progress downrange, the machine guns and mortars will shift from target to target, ahead of the assaulting Marines by a few hundred meters. Rifle Platoon Commanders call in and adjust mortar rounds that land a few hundred meters in front of them. The Marines will look to their leaders and judge them by their competence in controlling these heavy weapons with accuracy, since mistakes could be fatal to friendly troops.

During a three day final exercise in CAX, the battalion maneuvers while fully “meched up” — that is, embarked in Marine amtracs with M1-A1 tanks, and other support. During this final exercise, observers from 3/4 — another Battalion in 7th Marines — observed 3/7. The higher headquarters for 3/7 was 7th Marines Regiment, just as it would be in combat. During the final exercise, 3/7 would be fully “meched up” — that is, embarked on Amtracs with tanks and combat engineers attached. Moving North on the expansive base, 3/7 would manuever in Company Teams separated by miles. The Battalion would call in air support through Forward Air Controllers (FACs) attached to each Company, and through an Air Officer in the Battalion S-3 section. The Battalion Command Post would itself comprise several hundred Marines embarked it its own section of Amtracs and Humvees. Company Teams would manuever in the desert, calling in air strikes from Cobra attack helicopters and Marine aircraft, such as the AV-8 Harrier and F/A-18 fighter bombers. During the final exercise, though, the individual Marines themselves would probably not do much more than embarking and disembarking from their Amtracs to fire on a few targets in the expansive desert. Marines in the back of Amtracs would remember hours of being tossed around while the Amtracs drove around the desert. The troop commanders — platoon commanders, platoon sergeants, and maybe a squad leader — would sit in a troop commander’s hatch in the Amtrac, keeping situational awareness and reading a map. But, generally, the crew of the Amtrac would be following the orders of the Amtrac platoon commander, who rode with the Rifle Company commander giving him orders as to where to move his 14 Amtracs, along with the likely attachment of 4 Tanks. In the command Amtrac, the Company Commander would also have a Fire Support Team comprised of the FAC, an artillery forward observer, and a mortar forward observer. Upon hitting an objective — say a series of enemy armored vehicles — the Company Commander would probably first seek to suppress the targets with artillery and mortars, while calling in aircraft to destroy the targets, while also manuevering his tanks to take the targets under fire. The superiority of the US Armed Forces in the air, as well as the longer range of tank main guns would give the Marine Company Commander a large advantage over any potential enemy.

After the CAX in October and November, 2002, 3/7 phased down its Stateside training and participated in a few seminars on urban operations and the psychology of killing in December and January. During this period, the S-4 (Logistics) sections of the Battalion and higher command echelons would have focused on the complex, global logistical challenge of moving hundreds of thousands of men and their equipment to the Middle East for the coming war. 7th Marine Regiment, with its 7000 or so Marines in 1/7, 2/7, 3/7, and 3/4 was the Marine Corps’ lead Regiment for a concept known as the Maritime Prepositioning Force. The Marines have 3 squadrons of 3 or 4 ships each, strategically located throughout the globe. One of those 3 Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) squadrons is located at Diego Garcia, a British Island in the Indian Ocean, a few days easy sailing to Kuwait. During December and January, 7th Marines would execute a well-rehearsed global, logistical ballet that is just as significant in the Marines’ combat effectiveness as the CAX and the proficient use of weapons. As the Marines’ lead MPF Regiment, 7th Marines had the mission of being prepared to “marry up” with an MPF Squadron, which has all the equipment and all classes of supply to support the Regiment (together with higher headquarters, supporting aircraft, and supporting logistics in a MAGTF) for a period of several months. Of the possible places that the Marine Corps can offload a MPF, Kuwait is a well practiced destination for this gear. The staff of 3/7 and the higher echelons would massage arcane logistical scrolls which went by names like Time Phased Deployment Programs (the “tib-fib”), Remain Behind Echelon (RBE), and other categories which would keep parts of the Battalion spread between two continents in time zones directly opposite each other around the world.

Things only seemed to be getting worse for Carpenter when the “word” was passed that the battalion was still scheduled to deploy to Okinawa – every two years each infantry battalion either deploys to Okinawa or embarks onto a naval amphibious warship for seven months. Furthermore, 1MarDiv and MEF were sending advanced elements to Kuwait for the possible invasion of Iraq. “I’m thinking that I made the biggest bet of my life and it’s not going to work, and I’m going to end up on the ‘Rock’ during the invasion,” thought Carpenter at the time in frustration. However, fortune would again smile on Carpenter when he received a call during Christmas leave that 3/7 was going to fly to Kuwait during January and that the scheduled Okinawa deployment was cancelled.

On December 28, 2002, a Naval Message canceled the Unit Deployment Program, which in practical terms meant that Bellmont, Mejia, and Milinkovic would not get to know places like Kin Village in Okinawa or Pattaya Beach, Thailand in the coming years.

On January 3, 2003, the MPF drill was started by the 1st Marine Division. Groups of Marines with names like Equipment Reception Party (ERP) and Offload Preparation Party (OPP) went forward to Kuwait under the leadership of Battalion Executive Officer, Major Anthony Henderson. On January 4, 2003, the OPP went to Diego Garcia to link up with the MPF Squadron located there. The 3 Marines from the 3/7 OPP flew to the ships, and began to survey the gear that their Marines would pick up at the port in Kuwait.

On January 15, 2003, 3/7 issued its deployment order. 3/7 would be the first manuever battalion in the Marine Corps to deploy to Kuwait in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Writing to Col Carl Shaver, who had commanded Lima 3/7 in Vietnam, Captain Schreffler noted, “the company was the first Marine infantry unit to land in Kuwait in January 2003.” On January 16, 2003, the 30-Marine ERP departed from the United States for Kuwait. The ERP would meet the MPF ships in port and further break out the equipment for 3/7. From January 21 to 25, 2003, the main body of 3/7 departed the United States for Kuwait. LtCol Michael Belcher and his Sergeant Major Richard Lamelin flew on the first of four flights aboard 747s full of Marines with their rifles and other weapons. By January 27, 3/7 was established in Living Support Area (LSA)-7 in the Kuwaiti desert, north of Kuwait City. 3/7 provided command and control for further 7th Marines elements that flowed into theater, provided security for the base, and security for the ammunition supplies. Corporal Daniel Ramirez of 3/7 signed for the entire first installment of the 1st Marine Division ammunition as the only qualified ammunition technician in Kuwait.

From late January through mid March 2003, each company conducted training in the Kuwaiti desert, honing its combat edge. The staff executed command post exercises and terrain studies. The Companies like Lima 3/7 covered urban operations, prisoner handling, hand to hand combat, physical fitness, patrolling, breaching using engineers, hikes, test firing weapons, and professional reading.

On February 1, 2003, the Battalion published the operations order (OpOrd) for the coming invasion. The OpOrd would be modified by eleven written and verbal fragmentary orders (FragOs) during Operation Iraqi Freedom 1. On February 7, the OpOrd was issued on a terrain model for the Company Commanders, including Capt Schreffler, and the separate platoon commanders — including senior Lieutenants who commanded the highly coveted Combined Anti Armor Teams (CAAT) units which were comprised of gun trucks (armored Humvees) which carried the powerful M-2 .50 caliber machine gun and the Mark-19, fully automatic 40 millimeter grenade launcher, and the TOW Anti-Tank Missiles. A TOW GunTruck might carry 7 of the long-range (almost 4000 meter) missiles, along with a M-240 medium machine gun with 10,000 rounds, sachel charges of C-4, as well as M-4 Rifles (short versions of the M-16). The typical crew for a TOW Gun Truck might be 3 Marines. A TOW Gun Truck would pair up with a M-2/ Mk-19 Gun Truck to take advantage of “combined arms” — ie, using the heavy machine guns and the TOW missiles together. After one tour with a Rifle Platoon, an infantry Lieutenant would move onto a second job in the Battalion, which could include being the Weapons Platoon Commander in a Rifle Company, being the Executive Officer (XO) of the Rifle Company, or going on to one of the “independent platoons” such as the CAAT Teams in the Weapons Company. Marine Lieutenants prized an assignment to CAAT because it represented as much independence as a Marine Officer could expect in th first 3 years of his career.

At the terrain model, the Company Commanders and independent platoon commanders would walk through various maneuvers on giant models built by the battalion staff. These meetings could take hours. All the “actuals” (actual commanders) would be present. The personal bearing, physical fitness, reputation, and the commander’s relationships would all come into play in these face-to-face rehearsals for the ballet of war. George Schreffler would move either himself or a cardboard square representing his company through various scenarios — breaching at the border, moving and taking various objectives. The Marine Warfighting Doctrine of Manuever Warfare emphasizes speed (“Speed is a weapon,” advised the Marine Warfighting Manual), and finding enemy “gaps” and avoiding attritional fights at “surfaces.” The Warfighting Doctrine emphasizes teamwork and implicit communication. By February 2003, much of this base of trust would have already been built through the Marines’ educational system, through training at exercises like CAX, and through service in the same Battalion over the previous months. But, now in the Kuwaiti desert in February, 2003, 3/7’s leaders adapted all of these carefully developed relationships to the present terrain from LSA-7 to Baghdad.

On February 9, 2003, 3/7 executed a Battalion Combined Arms Rehearsal and updated the OpOrd. The rehearsal resulted in further changes to the OpOrd. Later in February, 7th Marine Regiment executed a combined arms rehearsal. On February 22-23, 7th Marines executed a command post exercise to make sure that it could use the communications equipment at the ranges the Marines would encounter in the desert. 7th Marines tested the communications gear to deconflict maneuver and fire support plans. In late February and early March, the Division of 18,000 Marines, commanded by Major General Mattis, repeated the terrain walks and communications validation exercises. On March 9, 2003, the Battalion- and company-commanders visited Ali al Salem air based to coordinate with the Cobra light attack helicopter squadrons that would support 7th Marines. The Cobra carries a 20 millimeter cannon capable of killing most vehicles, except for maybe some tanks, as well as long range missiles like the Hellfire and TOW, and shorter range missiles. The Cobra pilots had a reputation of being very close in their mindset to the Marine infantry on the ground — many of these pilots would have completed Infantry Officer Class (IOC) along with officers who had chose Infantry as a specialty. The rest of March was devoted to fine tuning changes in the fire support plan, and rehearsing the combined arms rehearsals down to the platoon level.

But while this intercontinental logistical operation may have operated as planned, it was not without its friction from the point of view of the Marines aboard the planes.

Flying out of March Air Force Base aboard a civilian airliner Lima Company landed at Kuwait International Airport on the 19th of January. To the surprise of everyone, they did not encounter the hot desert climate that they had expected. Instead, they encountered a wet and rainy forty-degree nightmare. As the sun began to set shortly after Lima disembarked from the aircraft things only got worse as they discovered their gear was soaking wet. Around 2200 (10 PM) a number of small buses arrived to transport the company to its pre-invasion staging area. “These Middle Eastern buses arrived — which at best could transport 15 people, without gear — pulled up and we began to load a platoon of Marines onto each. Tensions were high among the Marines, due to the weather, the wet gear, and the fact that the ammo that was passed out was not a lot,” recalled Carpenter.

As the buses lined up along the road a number of Kuwaiti and U.S military escort vehicles attached themselves to this small convoy of buses. It soon became apparent that the bus that Carpenter was on had gotten separated from the other buses. As the sun began to rise there was no sight of the other buses or escort vehicles. Being Marines, they began joking that they had already invaded Iraq.

Hoping to get a better view of the surrounding area the bus drove up onto a berm, where the Sergeant Major, the First Sergeant, and Carpenter got off the bus. In the distance the three could see a camp and began walking towards it. Waiting at the main gate was an Army PFC dressed in Gortex – the weather was still cold and overcast. To everyone’s disappointment this was not LSA-7, where the Marines were to be bivouacked at, but Camp New York. After several rounds of questions it turned out that no one in Camp New York had any idea where LSA-7 was. Guessing where they needed to go they boarded the bus and directed the bus driver back towards the main road. Eventually they were located by 3/7’s battalion executive officer (XO), Major Tony Henderson.

On that first day, LSA-7 was still under construction and consisted of only four large General Purpose tents (similar to circus tents). Over the next few days the camp would grow into what appeared to the Marines to be about four hundred tents. “As we were setting our gear in the tents, the Division Commander, Major General Mattis walked into the tent. He told us to get ourselves situated and that the remainder of 7th Marines and the rest of the First Marine Division would soon be on deck. Thus ended Carpenter’s first day in Kuwait.

Kurt Bellmont was a rifleman during this period. In a 4-Marine Fire Team, the Fire Team Leader, usually a Corporal (E-4) or senior Lance Corporal, carries a M-16 rifle with a 40 millimeter M-203 grenade launcher slung beneath. The Automatic Rifleman carries a M-249 Squad Automatic Weapon — a light machine gun that fires the same bullet as the M-16. The assistant Automatic Rifleman carries a M-16 as well as extra ammunition for the light machine gun. Finally, the Rifleman carries a M-16. Bellmont’s Fire Team Leader was Corporal Olmstead and his Squad Leader was Corporal Delfield. When we interviewed Kurt Bellmont in 2005, he recalls, “Looking back, it’s so funny, now I look at all these senior Marines and they’re just another Marine, but [in 2002] my squad leader, he was held up high on this perch because he was this big, bad squad leader.”

Since Lima 3/7 had come from deployments to the West Pacific in jungle environments like Okinawa, none of the more experienced Marine NCOs had much special knowledge about operations in the desert. “I didn’t know anything,” recalls Bellmont. “No one really knew anything. That was the interesting part. Because even the senior Marines that were over in Okinawa, that was the only place they had been. So they couldn’t [say] ‘we’ve got one up on you because we’ve been here before.’ They didn’t know anything either. They knew how to play in the jungle. But as far as the desert went in Iraq, they didn’t know anything.”

The training for the next two months, before the invasion, centered on mechanized operations. The invasion was to be strictly a mechanized war. Extensive training was conducted with the Amphibious Assault Vehicles (all Marines simply call these tracked vehicles AAV’s or Amtracs). Because of concerns about a chemical warfare attack by Saddam, there was additional decontamination training, antidote training, and the many other essential training related to these weapons of mass destruction. Live fire and some grenade training was conducted at Udari Range – a massive range of destroyed Iraqi vehicles from the First Gulf War. Urban combat training was conducted during this time despite the fact that there were few standing buildings in the immediate area. This illustrated the hight level of importance the Marine Corps placed on urban combat skills. On the night before the start of the ground war, Lima Company was interrupted during a night urban training exercise by a number of Amtracs arriving to ferry Lima back to LSA-7. “Around 2200 or 2300 Captain Scheffler received the word that we would begin the move to the Kuwaiti- Iraqi boarder for the invasion. Everyone was very excited and no one got any sleep that night at the prospect of going to war,” recalled Carpenter.

Not until a week before the start of the war did the first mail delivery arrive at LSA-7. Two months worth of mail suddenly descended onto the camp — letters, books, magazines, snacks, and all the other things that family, back home, wanted their sons to have.

“So, Lima was one of the last units to get back to LSA-7 before we moved to the border. It was at this time that we discovered that the company was assigned the task of sweeping out all the tents in the camp. Also, there was a huge bonfire being used to destroy all of the crap that we got in the mail, and didn’t have room for,” said Carpenter. Carpenter and the other Marines of Lima Company later learned that the bonfire used to burn their excess mail was responsible for several of the tents burning to the ground when the winds suddenly picked up. The reason that the tents had to be cleanly swept was that the Marines intended to use LSA-7 as a POW camp. But the outbreak of the fire may have changed plans for the camp.

Several kilometers from the border the Marines of Lima Company began to dig in at what was called the dispersion area (DA). As Carpenter was digging he began to think that it was bad luck that the company was conducting field training right before they got the orders to move. None of the Lima Marines had a shower in the last three days, and Carpenter wondered how long it would be until they would get a fresh shower. It would be many weeks until the company and Carpenter had the comfort of a shower.

To compound the discomforts of the Marines, the Grunts were also required to wear heavy chemical protective suits that they wore as a defense against chemical warfare agents. These activated charcoal lined suits would leave deposits of black carbon dust on their bodies. The protective masks also confounded the comfort of the Marines because chemical alerts were sounded from time to time. These masks would trap sweat and a heavy condensation from the breathing inside the mask, and the growing heat of the desert sun only added to a level of discomfort difficult for the average civilian to understand.

Looking around Carpenter noticed that all the chemical protective suits that the Marines wore were of the green woodland camouflage. The Army had the desert colored camouflage suits. “Well, he thought at least he and the other Marines were prepared for an invasion of North Korea.” Carpenter thought sarcastically.

Bellmont’s Squad Leader, Corporal Delfield told his Marines that they would be able to do their job better if they assumed that they would be killed once the Company crossed the line of departure into Iraq. Bellmont remembers that he did indeed adopt this mindset, and it did help his ability to deal with the uncertainty of that environment. “It was kind of scary because I remember when Corporal Delfield [said] ‘Well, you won’t be able to work well unless you know that you are going to die when you go there.’ So, that’s pretty much how we went in there the first time when we crossed the border for Iraq. Well, [we] just figured you’re going to die, and we figured you could do your job a lot easier…. That was kind of scary, but it was kind of cool after you thought like that, because then, nothing mattered.”

Some Marines may spend an entire tour of 3 years at bases like 29 Palms repeatedly training up to a certain standard designed to prepare the unit for deployment to a place like Kuwait for an operation like Iraqi Freedom. For every Marine who went through this progression from mid 2002 to early 2003, there were 10 or 20 who went through the same individual and unit training without actually putting these skills to the test. In the 60 days between mid January 2003 and mid March 2003, Lima 3/7 and the rest of the Division put the final touches on the explosive kinetic energy that the unit represented. On March 17, 2003 — St. Patrick’s Day — 3/7 executed a relief in place with the 1st United Kingdom’s Division’s 1st Battlegroup, Black Watch Regiment. The stage was fully set for combat operations.

...,1st Draft

Chapter 7 – Training and Deployment for Husaybah01 Feb

Chapter 7 – Training and Deployment for Husaybah

How would you describe the training for 3/7 before you went to OIF2?” – Author
“Fast paced, and if you take the training that came from above, practically worthless…”
-Gunnery Sergeant Sandor Vegh, USMC

34 14’48.3” N 116 05’27.96 E elev 570 meters Base Housing, Twentynine Palms Marine Base
Local GMT [18 Sept 2003]

[Section 1]

11-10-07_Carpenter.wav

Lima Company’s Gunnery Sergeant, Staff Sergeant Carpenter, worked very closely with the CO, Captain Gannon, both professionally and personally over the months following Lima Company’s return to 29 Palms. Carpenter was Lima Company’s senior enlisted Marine, not only a logistician, but an adviser on personnel, training, and tactical issues. Carpenter and Gannon were also neighbors with close family connections due to their large families, their common Catholic faith, and the friendship of their spouses. They were neighbors in base housing.

Max Leave. Marines return home, or go on vacation for a month. For Gannon and Carpenter, home is 29 Palms. Gannon made a promise to himself in Iraq to spend more time being a fun father with his kids. He made good on that vow in the days and weeks after his return to The Stumps.

Returning from the skate park with his oldest son, Rick Gannon saw Matt Carpenter, also spending some long, lost time with his kids, all seven of them.

“Matt, how are you doing?”

“Good, Rick, and you?”

“Just coming back from the skate park,” replied Gannon. Sally and Beth would work on Church functions together, and with 11 kids between them, the Gannons and Carpenters were very much part of an extended family in base housing. Boy scouts, cub scouts, hiking — Rick Gannon was a whirlwind of activity with his family in the days after returning from Iraq. Gannon had done much of this before, but he ramped up these activities in the period after Operation Iraqi Freedom.

34 14’0.15” N 116 03’20.43 E elev 562 meters Lima Company Headquarters, Twentynine Palms Marine Base
Local GMT [10 Nov 2003]

10 November. The Birthday Ball. The Marines were headed up to Laughlin for the Ball, a traditional celebration of Marine history and tradition. Lima had been back from Iraq for less than 60 days.

Word came down that Battalion 3/7 was re-deploying to Iraq. Carpenter recalls that the Marines never thought they would be returning to Iraq. Yet, now, Lima Company, which had been the first Marine Rifle Company to deploy to Iraq for The Push, would be among the first Marine Rifle Companies to re-deploy to Iraq for Operation Iraqi Freedom 2. The Company would be going back to Iraq in February, 2004.

Training does not occur without a certain bureaucratic ballet — reservation of ranges, ammunition requests, writing training plans, briefing training plans through several levels of the chain of command. It took weeks to get the ball rolling on training for the re-deployment to Iraq. RCT-7, the parent unit of 3/7, 1/7, 2/7, and 3/4 tasked 1/7 with setting up “Lane Training” — a series of shoot/ no shoot scenarios at the Squad Level to ingrain adherence to the Rules of Engagement in a civilian/ insurgent environment. However, the assumptions seem to have been skewed heavily by the experience of Battalion 3/7 in Karbala, and Battalion 1/7 in Najaf. Karbala and Najaf were relatively permissive environments without a strong insurgency. 1st Marine Division took some pride in the fact that they did not lose a Marine Killed in Action after the seizure of Bagdahd in the latter part of Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003. This confidence spilled over into OpEds by Battalion Commanders celebrating the success of “wave tactics” and even interviews with General Mattis on the same topic. By “wave tactics,” the Marine leadership meant waving to the local population, removing intimidating Oakley sunglasses, and doing foot patrols in their assigned zones, including Karbala and Najaf.

Time Crunch. After a 9-month deployment, Lima Company would have a total of 5 months in the United States, before re-deploying to Iraq. The Company was notified of the pending re-deployment with only 3 months to go. Effectively, the rest of November was used to plan an abbreviated training schedule to prepare for the coming deployment. So, Lima Company would go back to Iraq with about 2 months only of quality training time.

34 14’0.15” N 116 03’20.43 E elev 562 meters Lima Company Headquarters, Twentynine Palms Marine Base
Local GMT [14 Nov 2003]

Husaybah. Captain Gannon sat in his office and traced the city on the Iraqi-Syrian border on the map. Lieutenant Colonel Matt Lopez had taken command of 3/7, and he had given Gannon the word that Lima would be the Battalion main effort, and that Lima would be stationed in Husaybah. Because of this, Lima would be largely independent of the rest of the Battalion. As word of Lima’s designation as the Battalion Main Effort and the location in Husaybah filtered through the Battalion, the Marines grew excited. Away from battalion, Away from the flagpole — these were good things, in the view of Marines.

Captain Gannon was tracking events in Iraq, both through the news, and through official military channels, and he was very concerned. He read reports from the Army units that Lima Company was destined to replace.

The dominant assumption is that the re-deployment would be similar to Karbala. But, the reports that Captain Gannon was reading indicated that there was a growing insurgency, and violence was on the up-tick.

Most of the other officers and Staff NCOs in 3/7 were not as aware of the unfolding situation in Iraq.

“Well, Sir, what do you think?” asked Staff Sergeant Carpenter. Staff Sergeant Carpenter and Captain Gannon were alone in the Lima Company Offices.

“I think this is going to be a rough one,” replied Gannon.

“What do you mean?” asked Carpenter.

“It’s not going to be like Karbala.” Gannon was somber and reflective.

“I agree with you, Sir,” replied Carpenter. “I don’t think we’ll ever get that lucky again.”

“We’re not going to bring everybody home from this one,” concluded Gannon. Gannon tapped his finger on the 1 to 25,000 scale map, adapted from a satellite photograph of the city of Husaybah. A stack of news stories chronicled the deteriorating situation for an Army armored unit stationed in the outpost city. Gannon had studied them all, and dug through classified sources for more information.

“You know, everyone says it is the Army, they are all fucked up. We will just go in and square it away again. Wave tactics, hand out soccer balls and ice water. You don’t think it will be that simple, do you?” Carpenter had his own suspicions.

“No, Staff Sergeant. This is not a matter of the Army versus the Marine Corps.” Gannon’s words hung in the vacant offices. It was 1745, time for dinner. Gannon studied his watch and considered his neglected family, a 15 minute drive away in Base Housing, where “Staff Sergeant Carpenter” was “Matt” and a neighbor. “The insurgency is turning. We fucked up. Not the Marine Corps, but the DOD. The Army is taking some hard whacks. Look at this report,” Gannon gestured at one report from his stack of clippings. “IEDs — we didn’t have this level of IED activity in Karbala. This deployment is going to be a blood-letter.”

34 14’0.15” N 116 03’20.43 E elev 562 meters Lima Company Headquarters, Twentynine Palms Marine Base
Local GMT [2 Dec 2003]

Holidays are coming. Yet… so is a re-deployment to Iraq. Battalion 3/7 and Lima Company start training for the re-deployment coming in February, 2004 — just about 60 days away. No Range 400 — meaning, no Company level infantry attack, one of the hallmark training evolutions of Marine Infantry. Regiment — meaning 7th Marines Regiment, with the headquarters at 29 Palms — required Regimental level SASO Training in December, followed by a Division-mandated SASO package in January. In both packages, 3/7 would be the first unit going through.

SASO. In addition to the time crunch, SASO is the other reason that Lima 3/7 does not conduct a Range 400 Company level attack before the Husaybah deployment. 1/7 is in charge of setting up the first SASO Package — Stability and Support Operations. In future iterations, SASO will migrate to March Air Force Base, and then back again to 29 Palms when it is re-named Mojave Viper. The training is focused at the squad level on shoot/ no-shoot scenarios designed to enhance the squad leader’s proficiency. But, in December, 2003, the first SASO package is to be conducted aboard 29 Palms near the obstacle course on Mainside, walking distance from the barracks.

34 14’5.64” N 116 03’3.96 E elev 587 meters SASO Training, Twentynine Palms Marine Base
Local GMT [2 Dec 2003]

500 Meters. 2 Weeks to Christmas, and Lima Company’s Marines are bivouaced 500 meters from their barracks, going through Lane Training. Instructors from 1/7, a sister battalion whom all the Lima and 3/7 Marines know from common training experiences and social venues on the base and at nearby Palms Springs are the instructors. Link, a new squad leader, takes his men through the evolution. Bradley Watson, a new Lieutenant Platoon Commander, assumes command of 3d Platoon, with Link as one of his squad leaders. Bellmont serves in one of the squads in 3d Platoon, as does Mejia. But most of the training is focused on the squads. The Marines spend 10 days looking at the barracks from the Obstacle Course where they are bivouacked for the SASO package. Having spent 270 days in Iraq, and having less than 60 days until returning to Iraq, the proximity to warm beds while going through the evolution seems like a peculiarly cruel choice of placement for the training.

34 14’0.15” N 116 03’20.43 E elev 562 meters Lima Company Headquarters, Twentynine Palms Marine Base
Local GMT [17 Dec 2003]

“What’s the word, Sir?” Staff Sergeant Carpenter was in Captain Gannon’s office at The Stumps.

Captain Gannon looked up from his growing pile of reports. He thumbed through the latest summaries of IEDs from Husaybah and Al Qaim. “Staff Sergent, I am beefing up my life insurance policies. I suggest you consider the same.”

“That bad, huh?” Carpenter already knew the answer.

“Yeah. I am thinking it is going to be rough.” Gannon looked up. “Lima needs to be doing some training with a more offensive mindset than this SASO package.” After 10 days up on the berm, Lima was back in the barracks, getting ready for Holiday leave. Christmas was a week away.

“Roger that,” Carpenter said, the words coming out slowly as he considered what Rick Gannon was saying.

“I have tasked the XO with putting together a Company-level package out at American Mines.”

“Got it. Lt Neal mentioned that. I am tracking on that package too.” Carpenter was coordinating logistics requests including ammunition and armory support for the training. “Happy Holidays, huh, Sir?” ventured Carpenter.

34 14’48.3” N 116 05’27.96 E elev 570 meters Base Housing, Twentynine Palms Marine Base
Local GMT [26 Dec 2003]

“Cancer?” No shit, Matt Carpenter didn’t say.

Beth Carpenter nodded. His wife and the mother of their 7 children was confirmed to have cancer. The news left Matt Carpenter, one of the most highly qualified Infantry Marines, nearly speechless. Surgery was scheduled for January. In the coming weeks, Carpenter would be pulled from the Lima Company deployment, adding yet another leadership challenge to the unit. But, at the moment, Matt Carpenter did his duty to his first and most important obligation, that of Husband.

33 53’26.7″ N 117 16’38.1″ W elev 475m SASO Training, March Air Force Base
Local GMT [7 January 2004]

Battalion 3/7 is the first unit to go through the SASO Training at March Air Force Base. “We were victims of our last experience. We went to March Air Force base thinking that we would do the same thing that we did in Karbala,” recalls Carpenter.

By the January SASO package, Carpenter knew that he would not be deploying with Lima Company due to his wife’s cancer procedure. Carpenter was crushed because of his strong bond with the Lima Marines, especially the Weapons Platoon Marines, like Gibson.

[Section 2]

Link became a squad leader. Lima was back at the Stumps after the Push and Karbala. Lima had firefights in the war during the Push Up. Link had been in little engagements in Bagdahd, but nothing really crazy. Mainly, the combat had consisted of far away engagements, but no real maneuvering on the the enemy. The Marines had conducted raids, but never any heavy contact. Karbala seemed peaceful to Link and the Lima Marines. Karbala lead them to believe they had their job done.

Max Leave. The Marines left the Stumps for their homes for several weeks. Immediately upon returning to the Marine base, the word was passed: Get ready to go again. We are leaving in 3 months. Lima would go to the little town of Husaybah, an outpost on the Iraqi-Syrian border. New Marines were agitated by the prospect, speculating about what to expect in Husaybah. Link, and the veterans of OIF, were skeptical, thinking that Husaybah would be similar to the peaceful tour in Karbala. “Once we got there, it was pretty bad, like a slap in the face — the people changed completely,” reflected Link when the authors interviewed him in mid 2005.

Training for Husaybah consisted of local training at 29 Palms. Lima went through lane training, which focused on the squad. “They ran us through every scenario known to man,” recalled Link. Evaluators critiqued the orders process — basic infantry building blocks that General Mattis would refer to as being “brilliant in the basics.” Link thrived on the training. “It was good training. I liked it. It taught you that it was not about how physical you are, you gotta be able to think, it’s a thinking man’s game too.”

Link and his Platoon Sergeant went to SASO (Stability and Support Operations) School for a week and a half at Camp Pendleton. “Four IEDs blew up on one patrol. We’re looking at each other, like, this is ridiculous, this would never happen,” remembered Link. “But we go out there in real life, and seven of them would blow on one patrol, so it was pretty good training.”

Link’s first Team Leader, Lance Corporal Parker, was a “big Southern boy from Louisiana.” Link and Parker and all of his Fire Team Leaders came in together, having gone through Basic Training and School of Infantry together. They shared the experience of “being messed with” by the senior NCOs during OIF. They would sit and talk about how they would do it when they were in charge. “It’s a great feeling knowing you got that guy behind you. Your First Team Leader is your crutch. Probably the best team leader that I have seen in the Marine Corps, better than me, I would say. Part of that was that we were such good friends. Alot of it was that he wanted to do it for me.”

“My second team leader was forced on me,” notes Link. A NCO who went to Squad Leader’s School, Corporal Green, missed Lane Training and SASO School. Link recalls that Green was “a bitter guy, he couldn’t follow, he just wanted to be in a squad and lead.” Nonetheless, “he did his job, he took care of his three guys, that’s all I could ask for.”

“My third team leader was Corporal Jaramillo. He came from Security Forces,” recalls Link. They valued rank to fill the billet. “He wasn’t fit to be a team leader. I always attached myself with his fire team. I gave him my best 3 guys. They could run themselves. If we did a squad attack, I would always go with the third fire team because I trusted the other two team leaders.” Link thought particularly highly of his friend, Parker, who played a key role in making the squad so good.

Lance Corporal Billerback was Link’s point man. Link relied on him for navigation. “A lot of people say a squad leader needs to know where he is at all times. I agree with that,” notes Link. “But, the squad leader needs to be assessing the environment, especially when you take contact, he shouldn’t have to worry about certain things, like what grid we are at, who is on the radio calling what. Billerback handled that perfectly.” Link groomed Billerback on the orders process, and praised him as a “sponge for knowledge,” who would step up to be a squad leader a deployment later. Billerback was in the First Fire Team, under Parker.

Lance Corporal Plumber: “He’s kind of one of those kids, he’d pull that trigger if you need to. That’s pretty much all the responsibility you’d give him. Good Marine, Good guy. He needed a lot of work, that’s why he was in Parker’s Fire Team.”

“I also had Palmer in there, in Parker’s Team. I gave the hard guys to lead to Parker.”

The second team consisted of Uban and Hansen. “That was my 3 man fire team.” Uban was the squad RO (Radio Operator). “I’d say after 2 months, I didn’t have to say anything anymore. I’d go to having him call in a phase line or a contact report, and he’d be like, ‘I already did it, and I did this and this.’ It was a perfect scenario for a squad leader. I could just go assess an environment [due to Uban mastering the radio procedures.]” Uban, too, would go on to be a squad leader in a later deployment.”

“My third team consisted of Corporal Gates — well, right now [in 2005] he is a PFC because of a DUI. But out in Iraq, Gates was your go-to guy. If you needed to get something done, like making a terrain model, he loved doing tasks like that. He could have been a Squad Leader.”

“Buckmiller was the SAW Gunner in the Third Team. Stereotypical SAW Gunner, big, nasty kid, big chews and just loves shooting machine guns. Lance Corporal Travis Hanson rounded out the squad. This guy had the physical stature of a grizzly bear and the heart of a care-bear…the one man breach team! Hanson also carried a SAW and was commonly referred to as Lcpl Buckmiller’s Bash Brother.”

“Welsh was another SAW Gunner. Third Team was SAW heavy, usually a support element. Welsh usually did what Buckmiller did. Real good Marine too.”

“There was alot of leadership in the teams and in the squads that made it easy.”

Link and Parker lead their squad, one of three in Third Platoon, as a new Platoon Commander assumed command.

[Section 3]

WATSON

September 11, 2001. Smoke billowed across the national mall from the Pentagon. On the 11th Floor of the CNN Bureau of Washington, DC, Bradley Watson, 23, watched the smoke and decided to go to Marine Officer Candidate School (OCS) at Quantico, Virginia. Having graduated from Vanderbilt University, Class of 2001, with a degree in Political Science, Watson had worked for CNN for only a few months. He signed his papers for OCS on October 1, 2001, though it took a full year to go through the combined Fall 2002 OCC class. He was delayed from a Summer 2002 OCS slot because there were, at that time, not enough ground officer contracts to meet the number of qualified applicants.

Though only a brief 10 weeks long, Watson found that OCS served its purpose of creating a “Darwinian environment where only dedicated and capable candidates can excel.” Only a short drive from Washington, DC, Marine Officer Candidate School had the mission of screening and selecting future Marine Officers – a process accomplished through physical training, tactical field exercises, and some classroom academic work.

Next came The Basic School (TBS), also at Quantico. Watson found that the Basic School field problems were “still mostly based on a Cold War era mentality, essentially third generation warfare where enemy locations are clearly defined, almost always in a rural environment. The Quantico woodlands are good for training to Vietnam TTPs (Tactics, Techniques and Procedures) but not effective for Urban Techniques. In retrospect, after a full tour with a Rifle Company in Operation Iraqi Freedom 2 (and two Purple Hearts), and writing from a Marine Base under regular enemy mortar attack during his second combat tour in 2005-06, Bradley Watson would reflect: “TBS is making a push to adapt to 4th Generation Warfare. It’s interesting to point out that many of the counter-insurgency TTPs learned at TBS today are based on conflicts the US Military did not win decisively (Vietnam and Somalia).”

The last step in the year long training that a Marine Officer receives before taking command of a platoon of Marines was Infantry Officers Course (IOC), run out of a compound adjacent to TBS. Watson found this to be “by far the best training we received.” Shoot Move Communicate – Watson learned the motto at IOC, and those words ran through his mind during certain critical phases of the coming two combat tours in Iraq. His training at IOC, more than at OCS or TBS, conditioned Watson to do just that. He remembers IOC as a “meritocracy where no grades are given and students get more out of it because everyone is there with a sense of purpose to begin with.”

As Bradley Watson went through Operation Iraqi Freedom 2, he experienced first hand the strengths and weaknesses of his training at Quantico, as well as the insights and flaws in the Marine Plan for the 2004 Campaign. He would lose Marines killed in action, as well as being wounded himself repeatedly. He would lead his platoon in intensive urban combat and on a successful night infiltration. He would experience internal conflicts in his platoon with some of his own NCOs as every platoon does when there are changes in key leadership positions, and earn the enduring respect of some of his other NCOs for returning to his unit despite injuries which would have allowed him to leave for medical reasons.

2nd Lieutenant Watson joined Lima 3/7 at 29 Palms during the work up training for Operation Iraqi Freedom 2 in late 2003. In recounting the experience of joining 3/7, Bradley Watson writes, “I checked into Lima in October 2003 prior to 3/7′s deployment to OIF II being announced. There was still talk of going to Okinawa and getting back into the previous deployment cycle when I arrived. I checked in solo ahead of another group of infantry lieutenants who followed a couple of months later, and the battalion commander [Lieutenant Colonel Lopez] called me “Wall Street” because I was carrying my laptop in my leather briefcase from CNN. Maj. Gannon liked to take candid photos and asked me to take one carrying the briefcase with my body armor and helmet on – the name stuck. It was all part of being a new 2nd Lt in 3/7.”

He took command of 3d Platoon, Lima 3/7 – a rite of passage for countless 2nd Lieutenants, but a rite of passage that only a minority of new Lieutenants had to go through during a combat tour in a Small Wars environment.

***

[Section 4]

Gunnery Sergeant Sandor Vegh, USMC, was Lima Company’s Gunnery Sergeant for the Husaybah Deployment. The official job description for a Company Gunny says something about being the unit’s logistician. But, Sandor Vegh is quick to point out that his fitness report says nothing about logistics. Vegh was both the Company Gunnery Sergeant and the Company First Sergeant for much of the pre-deployment training for the Husaybah deployment. He was, first and foremost, Captain Gannon’s senior enlisted adviser, both a tactician and a leader in every respect. His language is colored by a historical, even a biblical, worldview. His worldview is rooted in his profession as a Marine Sniper, encompassing the history of Marine marksmanship training from World War I to the present, and in his Christian faith, encompassing from the Life of Christ to the present. Gunny Vegh’s faith and profession would both came to the forefront in his role as Lima Company’s dominant enlisted leader during the Husaybah deployment.

When he speaks of the training for Husaybah, he invokes the history of Marine Snipers, starting in World War I, taking ownership of the entire doctrine of precision marksmanship to discuss how the Lima Company had to re-learn basic lessons. When he talks about the leadership qualities of Lima Marines like Link or Mejia, he praises their ability to handle a squad independently for several hours in contact with insurgents, which he refers to as “killing Muslims.” Gunny Vegh, a strong Christian who speaks unapologetically about being saved by Christ, would go on runs with Lima Company in sandals because “if it was good enough for Jesus, it is good enough for me.” He disdains Anthony Swofford, with whom Vegh served in the same scout sniper platoon described in the book, Jarhead. He reserves his praise only for Marine Gunners, like Tim Gelinas, one of the longest-serving Marine Gunners, now a civilian employee with 29 Palms Marine Base in charge of developing the Mojave Viper facilities. Gunny Vegh is one of those rare individuals who seem quite common in the Marine Corps — truly philosophers of war, with a breadth of historical knowledge but a grasp of everyday, practical realities. When Gunny Vegh talks about a squad of Marines, it is clear that they could just as easily be 12 Disciples from the Gospel, or a squad of Marines from World War II. Take for example Gunny Vegh’s response to the author’s question, “How would you describe the training for 3/7 before you went to OIF2?”

“Fast paced, and if you take the training that came from above, practically worthless, which is pretty harsh language for anyone who is going to read a book,” recalls Vegh. “But if you go back to history, and use snipers as an example. We finish World War I, and we know that we need a long range tool out there. We work in the midst of World War I, to develop something like that. We didn’t have the weapons for that. So we progressively built better firearms. We get to World War II, and we have the same problem because between World War I and World War II we stopped training in that manner. We get to World War II and we are having to pick up [sniper training] again. We didn’t learn our lesson there either. We get to Korea, and we are hand-picking guys just because they can shoot. We are putting them through a fast course so they can learn long rang precision fire, putting them up on hilltops and letting them pick people off that way. We leave from Korea, and we don’t establish a school. We get to Vietnam, and everyone knows about Carlos Hathcock [a famous Marine Sniper], we’ve got to take some time and actually create a [sniper] school. So, in Vietnam, we create a package for snipers, which goes very well. Then, during the Cold War, we go from practically Vietnam to 1982 without an established [sniper] course, which is ridiculous… But from 1982 to the present, we have held onto a sniper school that is going to establish the traits or skills in certain Marines who are qualified so we can prepare them for the battlefields that are coming up. But even in that realm [of Marine Snipers], we still need sniper school because of the stalking that is involved. It is as if no one ever really thought that we would get involved in an urban war, yet we had all this stuff going on in Southwest Asia, where it is obvious that we are not going to fight out in the middle of the desert. We saw in 90-91, [Operation] Desert Storm/ Desert Shield, that I could see them for miles and miles and miles away — you know map sheets, we would go through map sheets before we ever saw anybody [referring to his service as a Scout Sniper in Battalion 2/7 during that conflict]. Then when we saw them, we would run through them, we would bomb them, kill the folks that we needed to, and then we would move on through. The only way that [our enemy] is ever going to fight in an environment like that is they are going to fall back into their homes, which give them cover, which is an urban environment, and that becomes MOUT [Military Operations in Urban Terrain]. We need to teach Marines how to fight in that manner [urban combat training]. We went 10 years before we really got serious about that. We held onto CQB [Close Quarters Battle], and then we started the MOUT training. But we never trained to a realistic manner. There was never any progression, until Marines got into the advanced course with initiative based tactics until the advanced course, but that was only for specialized units like FAST [Fleet Anti-Terrorist Team], but we never taught the grunts [the majority of Marine Infantry units]. So, now we are going to Iraq, and the thinking is that we are just going to take down Bagdahd. And that is a good thought, as long as we hold it to reality, and the reality would be that the only way we could go to Bagdahd, and leave, and say that we were victorious is to kill everyone, but we did not have the intestinal fortitude for that. So, somebody should have been thinking, and they were, but they have their own little wisdom bubble. But they only send drips of that bubble out. So now we are going to have guys go there and relieve them, and we give them these rules of engagement that say, ‘these guys [the Iraqis] are good people.’ If we are thinking that they are good people, then we have forgotten all about history. That’s why OIF 2 was such a burden for all of us. Because they wanted to be on the coattails of we are simply going to turn this country over to these people. And we totally forgot that a majority of those people are our enemies not so much because they had a uniform on, but because they truly don’t want anything to do with Americans. And that’s when it gets into a dispute of a holy war versus a war of oil or a war of just helping out humanity. They [the Iraqis] couldn’t care less about humanity. It’s definitely not about oil. If it was just about oil, we would have just owned Iraq and put our American flags up there. So, it has to be a battle that is on their playing field. [As we said over there] not every Muslim is a terrorist but every terrorist is a Muslim. We want to hold to them being terrorists instead of them being the enemy. So, we didn’t prepare [in the training for the Husaybah deployment] for that. We prepped, more or less, to go out and help people. But we are Marines. We can pretty much do anything with nothing. But in reality, we are not the guy who is going to go in and feed anybody, or teach anybody, because I just don’t have those assets.”

In short, Vegh sees a parallel between the Marine Corps, and, more broadly, the US Military’s tendency to let critical skills deteriorate between major wars. The critical skills that Lima Company needed, but failed to fully develop, before its deployment to Husaybah were urban combat skills. The assumption going into the Husaybah deployment is that it would be like the Karbala deployment, with a focus on nation-building, peace-keeping, and stability operations. Most broadly, Vegh feels that Lima Company failed to prepare for the true nature of the environment that it would deploy into during the 2004 tour. Lima failed to prepare for a fight with a determined insurgency that had the advantage of operating among a population with the same language.

In Vegh’s view, Lima Company’s training for OIF 2 was worthless because the unit did not train enough in urban warfare, and they emphasized humanitarian operations to an excessive extent. “We emphasized, ‘help the guy out,’ and I love the Old Man, the CG [General Mattis] was great. And I am sure he was following commander’s intent. As soon as those people became enemies to us, then we were going to switch over from the humanitarian hat and put on a helmet and go in and fight. Our saving grace, as Marines, is that at the foundation, especially the Grunts, know they are there to locate, close with and destroy [the enemy]. So Marines are capable of switching over quickly. But when you train to cordon and knock, that ridiculous statement that we have. If I train a guy to [knock] and say hello, I am going to search your house, and then the person inside the house becomes hostile, then I have to work up this whole thing of hostility [complying with the rules of engagement]. But if I come in with an offensive [mind set] then the Marines go in from the start and they are never caught off guard. It did not take the Marines long to figure that out, but it took the Marine Corps [chain of command] a long time to figure that out.”

Vegh doesn’t think that the insurgents deliberately used the Marines’ rules of engagements against the Marines. Instead, he thinks that the removal of Saddam Hussein freed the Muslims to re-make Iraq, the Cradle of Islam, into a Muslim country. The Marines were caught in the middle of this fundamental shift. “When we took Saddam out,” argues Vegh, “I believe the majority of Muslims were upset because they were being held down by a dictator. And we got rid of the dictator. That freed up those Muslims to do what the Muslims wanted to do in the first place, which is to make what they consider, and the world considers the hub of humanity a Muslim nation. We are not fighting Iraqis…. We are simply fighting the Republic of Islam, and those guys, by virtue of being who they are, are going to fight us, regardless of where they are.”

“They are simply sitting back, doing what I would do. They are doing their observation. They are finding a breach in the wire, and they are going to breach that gap. That gap becomes a guy standing more erect, or a guy knocking. That becomes a good gap until we go flat onto the offensive and let them know we are not going to do that. Unfortunately, it took our losing Marines, including senior Marines, before somebody realized we started off on the wrong foot let’s get back to the basics of locate, close with, and destroy [the enemy].”

***

[Section 5]

1st Lieutenant Dominique Neal, the Executive Officer (XO) of Lima 3/7 during the pre-deployment training for Husaybah had assumed his billet when the company was in Karbala. Lieutenant Neal had been working the the Battalion S-3 Shop when Captain Gannon played an instrumental role in recruiting the frustrated Lieutenant back to Lima Company, where he had already served as a platoon commander. Lieutenant Neal had become frustrated with some of the administrative tasks he was assigned in the S-3 Shop. Captain Gannon, recognizing Lt Neal’s frustration, facilitated a move back to Lima Company for Lt Neal, which seems to have created a strong sense of loyalty on the part of Lt Neal towards Captain Gannon, whom several Lima veterans described as a “team builder.” In the episode in Karbala when Captain Gannon recruited Lt Neal to Lima, Neal recalls that Gannon both calmed down Neal after some particularly frustrating administrative assignments, then within a day, set up the transfer to Lima Company. Such seemingly minor personnel shifts can be very important to the experience of a Infantry Officer on his first tour in the Fleet Marine Force. Captain Gannon’s ability to build a strong core of leadership within Lima Company depended on such mundane acts of personnel management — in fact, in the coming deployment to Husaybah, this act of recruiting Neal as XO would set the stage for a historic assumption of leadership by a First Lieutenant. Even his fitness report as the S-3A (assistant Battalion Operations Officer) reported that Neal had the endurance to deal with the administrative drudgery in the staff billet, and to continue to push forward and not lose sight of the intent — a report which allowed Neal to continue without any adverse impact on his future career.

Lieutenant Neal and Gunny Vegh developed a strong bond, and would form the core leadership for Lima in the upcoming deployment to Husaybah.

Lieutenant Neal describes his relationship with Captain Gannon as the “closest relationship that I have had with any Marine Officer, or any senior officer. They tell you that you should never get too close to any Marine because you might lose them, or you might have to make a difficult decision. But Captain Gannon was one of those individuals that you just had to [form a close personal bond with.] You’d probably hurt more if you didn’t get to know him or get close to him.” Neal’s praise for Gannon’s personal qualities echoes Gunny Vegh’s regard for Gannon, who described him as a “fine man.”

Continuing in his description of Gannon, Neal notes, “He’s the kind of person if you got out of the Marine Corps, he could be a friend. Quite honestly, he could be a Godfather of my kids. A good friend of mine, Major Schreffler [the former Lima Commanding Officer during The Push] is the Godfather of [Captain Gannon's] son. I look at Captain Gannon the same way. He’s just that guy. He was a mentor. He was a teacher. He was a friend. He was the kind of person that if you failed him, you felt bad. He was the kind of person that you expected to give your best effort to him.”

Neal notes some of Captain Gannon’s best qualities as follows. “When he gave you a task, he always gave you a task and purpose. Anything guidance that he gave you, he always pushed out to you that he made sure how important it was to him. I’ve never seen that from any other officer that I have worked with.” Neal is describing the idea of “mission orders” in which a superior is supposed to give “intent” but not describe exactly how to accomplish that “intent” or “mission.” This is one of the central tenets of 3d Generation, Manuever Warfare, which is the official doctrine of the Marine Corps, noted in the official publications such as Fleet Marine Force Manual 1 – Maneuver Warfare. As a life-long student of military affairs and doctrine, Captain Gannon would have recognized the important of issuing mission oriented orders and guidance. That Neal singles him out as the exception in using mission guidance may suggest that using Maneuver Warfare in practice in the Marine Corps may be the exception, not the rule, official doctrine notwithstanding.

Neal cites an example of Gannon’s use of mission type orders in the training for the Husaybah deployment. Captain Gannon had limited time in the work up for Husaybah. Most of the training was oriented at the squad level. The Karbala phase of the OIF1 deployment seems to have created a low expectation for the level of violence in the upcoming deployment. Captain Gannon gave Lt Neal, his XO, the following guidance for a brief, 3 day period of Company level training as follows: “Hey, XO, I am thinking of doing this Range out in American Mines. This range is very important to me because we have been doing this SASO [Stability and Support Operations] training. I want to get back to the conventional side. I need you to go out there 3 days early to build this [set up the range for training].”

American Mines is one of the training areas on 29 Palms Marine Base — little more than a section on military maps consisting of dozens of square kilometers of empty, high desert terrain. 1st Lieutenant Neal would have gone out to the area, set up targets, and developed a plan for the 180 Marines of Lima Company to cycle through Squad and Platoon attacks. Captain Gannon’s intent and concern for conventional training belies a concern about the upcoming deployment that the environment would not be as benign as more senior commander’s assumed.

American Mines would have been Company level training, a 3 day period of training conducted at the discretion of the Company Commander and his staff. The SASO training was organized by the Division with assistance from the Quantico-based Marine Corps Warfighting Lab (MCWL). The SASO Package would evolve, over the course of several years, into Mojave Viper. SASO was originally based at March Air Force Base, close to Camp Pendleton, but Mojave Viper would be developed at 29 Palms. The SASO “Lane Training” put the 13-Marine Squads — such as the one lead by Sgt Milinkovic — through a series of Rules of Engagement (ROE) scenarios in which the Marines had to choose between the right use of levels of force when dealing with a mixed civilian-insurgent environment.

But, Gannon’s guidance to Neal suggests that the Lima CO was concerned with a more kinetic set of scenarios. Gannon’s intent to Neal reveals his mindset, which was a result of consulting with the intelligence reports, and reading and studying the situation through open source news reports, as well as classified reports. Gannon thought that Lima Company was under-prepared to fight as a cohesive Rifle Company. In the abbreviated work-up for Husaybah, the SASO training was oriented at the 13-Marine Squad Level, and was mainly oriented towards a benign environment like Karbala. In the American Mines 3-day exercise, Lima Company trained for what Neal called “having an offensive mindset.” Neal recalls, “we did squad level, and platoon-level training [at American Mines]

Another example of Captain Gannon giving Neal a “mission type order” with “commander’s intent” was when Gannon directed Neal to go on advance party for the deployment to Husaybah. Gannon said, “Hey XO, I need you to go out on advance party 3 days or a week before everyone else leaves with the Company Commanders so you can get a fair assessment of what is going on.” Gannon was very conscientious in making sure that his second-in-command, Lieutenant Neal, had a high degree of “situational awareness” even from the first step in deploying Lima Company to Iraq for its second combat tour. This is consistent with the characterization of Captain Gannon as deeply concerned that the situation in Iraq was very different from the scenario of a benign environment, which most of Lima’s pre-deployment training had been based upon. Captain Gannon, a student of military history, and the son of a Marine Officer who had served in a complex insurgency in Vietnam, would have known that there was a high possibility that Husaybah could erupt into a full-fledged counter-insurgency fight. He would have known that his own incapacitation was a very real possibility. In such as situation, he would have known that Lima Company would depend on leaders being required to step up — for a XO to step up to the role of CO; for a Platoon Sergeant to step-up to the role of Platoon Commander; for a 1st Fire Team Leader to step up to the role of Squad Leader. Even in the small decisions — such as including Lieutenant Neal on advance party in order to “get a fair assessment of what is going on,” Captain Gannon was preparing his unit for a situation in Husaybah that was much more volatile than the pre-deployment training assumed.

The Authors, Doug Halepaska and Janar Wasito, were both Lima Company alumni who had served in the early 1990s in the roles of Machine Gunner (Doug), and Platoon Commander and Company Executive Officer (Janar). They came into this project with that experience, but also with the life experience of having gone to college (Doug) and law school (Janar) after leaving the Marine Corps, then into Federal Law Enforcement (Doug) and the Investment Management Business (Janar). The Authors approached the project as building a case, similar to a legal case, for the idea that Lima Company made the transition from 3d Generation Manuever Warfare to 4th Generation Advanced Counterinsurgency. But, first and foremost, in their recollection of their experience as Marines, Authors Halepaska and Wasito recalled their roles with Lima Company, more than a decade earlier. As such, the Authors were aware of how small clues, such as Captain Gannon’s focus on giving intent with every order could shape the Command Climate or culture of a unit like a Rifle Company. Authors Halepaska and Wasito were not friends in the early 1990s when they served together in Lima 3/7, then again on the Regimental Staff in the S-3 Operations section — military rules against “fraternization” restricted the two from becoming friends. But, they did frequently discuss military history, from German campaigns during World War II, to modern campaigns, simply because both Halepaska and Wasito liked reading military history. These discussions occurred out in the training area of 29 Palms while waiting for trucks to move back to Mainside from Range 400, or out on deployment in Korea or Thailand. Years later, Authors Halepaska and Wasito would become friends, and decide to work on this project together.

The relationship between a Company Commander and a Company Executive Officer is one of the crucial relationships that sets the tone for the entire unit of 150 Marines. From Dominique Neal’s interviews, we find that Captain Gannon was the type of man who inspired his subordinates to give their best out of high regard and respect for all the personal qualities that Rick Gannon possessed — physical courage, and intellectual insight into the profession which was a family calling. Lt Neal thrived in his role as Lima XO because Captain Gannon gave him mission orders and a clear purpose. The purpose that Captain Gannon described belied a concern that the insurgency that Lima would fight in the coming deployment would be much worse than the relatively benign environment in which Lima operated in Karbala in 2003. Rick Gannon’s cultivating Dom Neal’s thorough situational awareness also suggests that he knew that there was a likelihood that his second-in-command may have to take over in combat.

The authors asked Dom Neal what he thought of the pre-deployment training for the Husaybah deployment. “We didn’t have a CAX. All we did was Lane Training with 1/7 and then we did some SASO training down at March Air Force Base.” Regarding the SASO training, Neal notes, “Initially, I thought it was right on the mark. This was because we came from Karbala, which was a permissive environment. You could patrol out there without doors on your Humvees. We heard about IEDs but they did not exist. There was a lot of waving and smiling, and alot of waves back. So that is what I thought the environment [in Husaybah] was going to be like. However, Captain Gannon was still very concerned about the offensive mindset. Yeah, we need to be able to do that [SASO type operation], but we still need to have a good fight. So, [in summary, the pre-deployment training for Husaybah] was effective for the mission that we were going into. But, then going into OIF 2, and realizing how volatile the environment was, we definitely had to do some shifting gears. The SASO [training] that we went through was not at all like the environment that we were going into. It was much more complex.”

Unfortunately, the American Mines training only included Squad- and Platoon-level training, but not Company-level training. 13-Marine squads would have conducted attacks with full use of all their organic weapons — M-16 rifles, grenade launchers, and light machine guns (SAWs), and perhaps supporting medium machine guns (M-240 G). 40-Marine Platoons would have also conducted attacks with the same weapons, and perhaps 60 millimeter mortars, and 83 millimeter rockets (SMAW). But, the entire 150-Marine Lima Company did not maneuver as a unit using live ammunition. There simply was not time.

Moreover, Lima Company, and 3/7, did not conduct a full CAX (Combined Arms Exercise), which would have included a running of the Range 400 Series, which included squad-, platoon-, and company-level attacks, followed by a mechanized battalion-level exercise over multiple days. After 3/7 left for Husaybah, Battalion 1/7 would execute an abbreviated CAX training schedule which included the Range 400 series, but not the full battalion level mechanized training. Instead of the battalion level mechanized training, Battalion 1/7 would cycle through a company-level convoy exercise which included ambushes in a rudimentary village; an ambush with a helicopter casualty evacuation further down the road; and a limited use of helicopter gunship (AH-1 Cobra) combined arms. Lima Company, as part of the first battalion to deploy back to Iraq for OIF 2 would not have this level of Company-level combined arms training.

“There just wasn’t alot of time,” summarizes Dominique Neal, recalling the period. “We got back in October. We went on leave, then found out we were going back over and had to re-constitute quickly and prepare with what we had. But that American Mines training was the best thing because it made us realize how much SASO is not about how much lead you throw down range, but it is like being a surgeon, making precise hits. After that [SASO training] our gunnery was not as aggressive, we were not getting that overwhelming firepower that we wanted. It was good that we went through American Mines, because we could say, ‘get that SASO mindset out of your brain. These targets here are no-kidding hostile enemy, you gotta shoot them, or they are going to kill you.’ That’s what we did. We went out there and worked on squad-level and platoon-training.”

Source: Neal5.mov

http://lima37.com/interviews/070617/Site/Neal/3700BFC9-6331-400F-8D58-2111245A0063.html

[Section 6]

The Authors asked Gunny Vegh to describe the personalities of the key Lima leaders going into OIF2. Again, Gunny Vegh’s response goes to the collective and individual qualities that allow a unit and a Marine to function in the stress of combat, especially the ability to maintain a certain sense of humor in the most stressful situations.

“We didn’t go as a full Company. Our platoon sergeants were Sergeants or Staff Sergeants and we had very junior Lieutenants. But just like any other war, you go into [the war with key leaders who are more junior than the table of organization requires]. But our unit picture shows ‘Luscious Lima’ [a illustration of the Rolling Stone lips], that bothers alot of people [among the rest of the Battalion 3/7 staff]. It is strange that it would bother those folks. And the folks that it bothers have never done the job that these Marines are being called to do. If you send a guy in to fight a battle, and you don’t allow a guy to smile in the midst of that. He doesn’t smile because he thinks killing is fun, he smiles because if he doesn’t smile, he is going to lose body function, he is going to lose control of his faculties and you can’t afford that. So, the way our company defeated that, is we kept things together. And history shows that the units that stayed together in that manner that were capable of laughing when laughter was needed and crying when crying was needed were capable of doing that. But in all things, they were going to stick together because they were the ones that were going to get the job done, regardless of what anyone else was going to do. And I think as a whole our characters proved that.”

The Authors would find this theme of “Luscious Lima” repeated in multiple interviews, including with Rory Quinn, who joined Battalion 3/7 mid-way through the Husaybah deployment, and who would take over Lima 3/7 after the Husaybah deployment. Quinn, recognizing the humorous, even counter-cultural, nature of the “Luscious Lima” character would solicit input from the unit’s leaders, notably Staff Sergeant Carpenter, who apparently coined the term, “Luscious Lima” with the Rolling Stones’ lips image, as a illustration that captured the humor in the face of risk that allowed the unit to keep functioning on a unit- and individual-level. Elsewhere, Gunny Vegh and Lieutenant Neal note that Captain Gannon both accepted and encouraged this sense of humor among Lima’s key leaders in the work up to Husaybah. On one occasion, while briefing more senior officers on a terrain model during SASO training at March Air Force Base, Captain Gannon, using a candy swizzle stick, remarked, “Hey, XO, this is crack.” Gunny Vegh notes, “You had to know Captain Gannon to realize, ‘Hey, Captain Gannon just made a funny. That was a joke for Captain Gannon.’”

The Authors asked Gunny Vegh to point out certain situations where Lima Company demonstrated the resilience borne of the Luscious Lima sense of humor in order to persevere. Gunny Vegh pointed not so much to the Company’s top leadership, but rather to the Squad Leaders. “When people look at the key leaders, they are thinking more of the Company Commander, like Captain Gannon. It’s the Squad Leaders that are running the show. If you take a Marine Corps Squad Leader who in our case was a Lance Corporal, or a Corporal, or a Sergeant at TO [Table of Organization], and that’s never going to happen in this company, or hasn’t happened because we just don’t have Sergeants for that.”

Gunny Vegh makes the point that most of Lima Company’s Squad Leaders going into OIF 2 were more junior than required by the TO [Table of Organization] grade required — a Sergeant. This environment created a meritocracy where the best Marines moved up, Marines like Link, Parker, and Mejia who became the 3 Squad Leaders in 3d Platoon either at the start of or early in the Husaybah deployment. Link clearly excelled among his peers, and was assigned a squad leader from the end of OIF1. Link’s first team leader, Parker, would become a Squad Leader early in the OIF 2 deployment. But, Link was a junior Corporal, an E-4, in a Sergeant or E-5 Billet. Parker, his friend from Basic Training and School of Infantry, also was a Lance Corporal, E-3 or Corporal, E-4, who “stepped up” when circumstances demanded it. Mejia also was a Lance Corporal or Corporal who would shortly step up to assume the role of Squad Leader during the upcoming deployment. As Link noted, many of the senior Staff NCOs had left Lima Company, “leaving all of us in charge” — meaning that Enlisted Marines on their first infantry tour were in a position to move up to the role of senior NCOs and Staff NCOs. Sergeants are often on their second infantry tour by the time that they command Squads, and Staff Sergeants are often on their third infantry tour by the time that they are Platoon Sergeants. Gunny Vegh and Link’s point is that the unusual personnel environment of the Iraq War created the need for the usual meritocracy of Marine Infantry to be radically accelerated. As Marines in later Lima Company Iraq Tours would put it, Rank is Nothing, Talent is Everything. This theme was in place by the training for OIF2.

Describing the role of the Squad Leaders during the Husaybah deployment, Gunny Vegh invokes the dual themes of his faith and focus on infantry proficiency. “If you take the Squad Leader, he is like 13 in the chain of command of the world. If you think of the President of the United States as next to Jesus, and then everyone else is junior to him. So, he is a major leader. It is the Squad Leader who is making the calls out there. If you look at the Squad Leaders that we lost, and the Fire Team leaders that we lost, those are the leaders that had to keep the squads together and have them come back and stick together. He’s truly the guy who is making the decisions out there.”

The authors asked Gunny Vegh to describe the squad leaders during the OIF 2 Deployment. “You have Link, Sweeney. Third Platoon’s saving grace was their squad leaders, especially once their platoon sergeant left. Sergeant Soudan was able to pick up Platoon Sergeant for 3d Platoon. That is a hard step in the midst of that.” Sergeant Soudan was a squad leader in 2nd Platoon, but he moved to 3d Platoon as the Platoon Sergeant eary in the Husaybah deployment.

“Too often people are looking at Platoon Sergeants and Company Gunnery Sergeants as being logisticians, but my fitness report doesn’t say anything about being a logistician. My job as a Company Gunny is to make sure my boys can go out there and find Muslims and kill them, or whoever the enemy is at that time. I have a police sergeant who hands out MREs and tents. The platoon sergeant needs to make sure that those things are happening in his platoon. Sergeant Soudan did a good job with that. There were some issues between [Sergeant Soudan] and the Platoon Commander [Lt Watson as a result of] character.”

The authors asked Gunny Vegh to characterize the individual squad leaders. Speaking of the OIF 2 Squad Leaders as a group, Vegh recalls, “Their goodness came from OIF 1, where they spent that whole trip in the back of an Amtrac together. Then you hit the combat in Bagdahd, and the monotony of the patrols in Karbala. All of those Marines were very young. Then those senior Marines from OIF1 left, and those junior Marines had to take over. To give some kudos to the training that we did, it gave those junior Marines who are now squad leaders the opportunity to ensure that the rest of the squad knew that they are the squad leader. It gave them the basic leadership skills to direct the fire and movement and go where they needed to go.”

Regarding Link, Vegh noted, “Link is a good kid. He’s a little sick in the head. He’s a good Marine. That boy can eat anything. If he doesn’t eat it, he will darn sure bite the head off. He knows his place, he has a good presence of mind. He can think on his feet when he is out in the midst of that, which is a good attribute of what you want for a squad leader or a platoon sergeant. And when the fog of war gets in there and other people are having a tough time focusing or concentrating, you got to have someone like Link who is capable of saying, ‘Oh yeah, we have to do this.’ And if someone is capable of making a decision in the midst of that, someone like Link is capable of making a decision on his own, is just as capable of following a Marine who is willing to make a decision in a timely manner.”

Vegh thought “Lightfoot was a pretty good squad leader. When he had his boys, he was good with his boys. He was taken out too soon” to see how he would perform in the long run.

Vegh thought “Parker jumped up and did a good job. He filled the boots he needed to fill. That platoon [3d Platoon] was capable of doing great things. You could have taken Parker or Link or Mejia and sent them out to the world and knew that they were going to handle what ever [was going to happen]. They all three were capable of knowing that they had 13 Marines with rifles, and unless they were up against 20 or 30 Muslims, they could handle it, and they were willing to get into the fight, and take the fight to whomever wanted to fight, and calmly over the net say, ‘hey, this is the situation I am in.’ ‘Do you need support?’ ‘No, we’re good right now, but a little bit of support down the road is not bad.’ But it wasn’t them getting on the net saying, ‘Hey, I need a react force right now because I got 3 guys shooting at me.’”

In short, Vegh gives great credit to the independent, operational competence of Squad Leaders Link, Parker, and Mejia. In his estimation, one of the hallmarks of a good squad leaders was the ability to continue to operate independently despite being in contact with an enemy force and to keep his cool under fire.

Source: Vegh8.mov

http://www.lima37.com/Site/Interviews2/C9109F58-4C78-4D33-82AC-35D5D6575566.html

Source: Vegh9.mov

http://www.lima37.com/Site/Interviews2/331B8F86-4A25-418F-A2E0-F4B398931D61.html

[Section 7]

Neal6.mov

http://lima37.com/interviews/070617/Site/Neal/C87CE43F-2237-4926-B7A3-8E70E57CCAEE.html

[Section 8]

Vegh12.mov

[Section 9]

Link22.mov

34 14’0.15” N 116 03’20.43 E elev 562 meters Lima Company Armory, Twentynine Palms Marine Base
2015 Local GMT 5 February 04

Lima Company was drawing weapons from the Armory, preparing to board buses to March Air Force Base for the flight to Iraq. But everything was wrong. Weapons were not ready, and the delays were backing up the schedule to make the move to March Air Force Base.

Captain Gannon had a reputation for remaining calm in almost any situation. But this was enough. Whether a deliberate choice to show his temper, or simply out of interminable frustrations built up over several months, Captain Gannon almost exploded at the incompetent Armory staff.

Carpenter drove Gannon back to “the grinder” — a large, asphalt deck with parking and basket ball courts, perfectly situated for organizing hundreds of men with their packs while waiting for transportation to deployment. Lima was launching, with a full compliment of weapons or not.

“Hey, can you take care of this. Can you send as much of our gear out there as possible?” Gannon was livid, but he had calmed down in the short ride to the grinder from the armory. He was a Marine Rifle Company Commander, getting ready to take 185 Marines to a war zone with an insurgency on the rise, and he was leaving without all of his weapons.

“Yessir. Not a problem,” Carpenter replied.

“Who the fuck dropped the ball on this?” Gannon was not a man who swore often.

“I have my suspicions, but the Battalion is short-staffed all around,” Carpenter observed. It was true, of course. All of Lima’s squad leaders were junior Corporals filling a senior Sergeant’s billet. The same trend was true in Headquarters and Service Company, which staffed the Armory. “Don’t worry, I will take care of it.”

“Thanks, Staff Sergeant.” Composed again, Gannon got out of the truck.

45 minutes later, the NCOs were standing outside of the bus, the last ones to load up.

Carpenter shook Corporal Gibson’s hand, saying, “Take care of your brothers.”

“No problem,” replied Gibson. “I will see you when you get over there.”

“Roger that,” confirmed Carpenter.

Carpenter next said goodbye to Sergeant Champion, the acting Weapons Platoon Sergeant. The understanding was that Carpenter would take over that role again when he re-joined Lima Company in Iraq. Gunnery Sergeant Vegh, who had been the Lima 1st Sergeant for much of the last 5 months, had moved down to take over the Company Gunnery Sergeant function when Carpenter’s wife had been diagnosed with cancer at Christmas. First Sergeant Calderon had joined Lima Company in January also. He had taken over the role of Company 1st Sergeant while the Company was at SASO.

Carpenter looked at Champion and said, “Hey take good care of them.”

“Roger that,” replied Sergeant Champion. “I’ll do a good job.”

The last man that Carpenter said goodbye to was Rick Gannon. He shook his hand and gave him a hug.

“Staff Sergeant,” said Gannon. “This will probably be the last time that we will work together.”

“Oh, hell no,” Carpenter rejected the idea. “I am coming over there. Don’t you worry. Beth is going to get a clean bill of health, and my ass will be over there.”

Gannon replied, “Well, don’t be rushing. You take care of Beth.”

11-10-07_Carpenter.wav

[Section 10]

After 3/7 deployed to Qaim in early 2004, 1/7 remained at 29 Palms. 1/7 was slated to replace 3/7 at the end of the summer. Through the year, 1/7 would monitor the news from Anbar while it trained.

34 13’51.09” N 116 03’21.31 W elev 1758 ft

Local GMT 31 March 2004

Lieutenant Colonel Chris Woodbridge sat in the Battalion Commander’s Office of 1st Battalion, 7th Marine Regiment, at 29 Palms, California – known in the Corps as The Stumps. The sprawling desert combat base, home of the desert tortoise, and almost half of the combat power of the 1st Marine Division, was set in an inhospitable stretch of land halfway between Los Angeles and Las Vegas. 1/7 was headed back to Operation Iraqi Freedom for the second round – OIF 2. The Battalion had participated in The March Up from Kuwait to Baghdad in the Spring of 2003. After the 19 day sprint, 1/7 had been assigned an area of responsibility in the City of Najaf, one of the most holy sites in the Shiite sect of Islam. There, LtCol Woodbridge assumed command of the battalion. Now, in the Summer of 2004, 1/7 was preparing to head back to Iraq, this time to relieve 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, which was operating out on the border of Iraq and Syria near towns with names like Al Qaim and Husabayah. 1/7 had rotated through the Combined Arms Exercise at 29 Palms, which had been stripped down from the armor heavy and supporting arms heavy training programs of the 1990s to a bare bones package which focused on convoy operations and the squad, platoon, and rifle company attacks which were the heart of Marine Infantry training. When 1/6 and 3/6 had rotated through the Combined Arms Exercise earlier in the year, the two Afghanistan-bound battalions had opted for exercises which focused almost entirely on foot mobile operations in the jagged mountain ranges of 29 Palms.

LtCol Woodbridge, and his Sergeant Major, Sergeant Major Weiser had focused on small unit skills as well because of their experience in An Najaf in the Summer of 2003. In the Spring of 2004, elements of the 1st Marine Division had started to rotate back into Iraq – this time into the so-called Sunni Triangle in Al Anbar Province. The Commanding General of the Division, Major General Jim Mattis, and some of his subordinate commanders, like LtCol Sam Mundy, had given interviews in which they openly discussed “wave tactics” – waving to the locals – and the value of providing ice water to crowds to establish a positive relationship with the local population. They had been quoted saying that in the Summer of 2003, the Marines patrolled without flak jackets, removed their intimidating Oakley sunglasses, and otherwise fulfilled General Mattis’ guidance to be “no better friend, no worse enemy.” Articles in local San Diego newspapers in January 2004 even suggested that the Marines would wear their green digital camouflage uniforms to distinguish them from the other American armed forces, which the 3 star general commanding the Marine Expeditionary Force suggested were using excessive force. The Marines, according to their campaign plan for OIF 2, would take a less confrontational approach which emphasized civic affairs programs to build a positive rapport with the local population, which, it was hoped, would welcome the digital clad leathernecks with the same level of cooperation as the 1st Marine Division had enjoyed south of Baghdad in the Summer of 2003.

The enemy – whoever that was, exactly? – apparently understood the 1st Marine Division Commander’s Intent just as well as the troops. All of the interviews and news stories were, after all, open source – that is, they were available on the Internet. The enemy attacked General Mattis’ strategy from the time that the first Marines hit the deck in Al Anbar province to relieve the 82nd Airborne Division. The most prominent event, of course, was the killing, mutilation, and graphic hanging of 4 American military contractors – former Special Forces soldiers and SEALs employed by Blackwater USA of North Carolina. Through this act, among others, the insurgents got inside the Marine’s Information Operations decision making loop. Actually, the Marine Command itself, lead by LtGen Conway, advocated restraint at first, so that it would not appear that the Marines, freshly arrived in theater, were reacting to the provocative event. But then, the brute violence of the insurgents’ action gained momentum at the higher levels of the Coalition and American command structure. The indelible images of those 4 charred corpses, hanging from that bridge in Fallujah, had their inevitable effect. Against the better advice of the Marines on the ground, the American national command authority ordered the Marines into combat in order to seize Fallujah, a massive city of 300,000. Then, just as abruptly, days before final victory, the American chain of command ordered a halt to offensive operations, while a combination of non governmental negotiators from the U.N., and representatives from the Coalition Provisional Authority, and representatives of the Marine units themselves negotiated a series of inadequate truce arrangements which left an Iraqi militia in charge of Najaf.

The Marines, who had been rotating through a mock Iraqi town built out of a former housing complex next to March Air Force Base in the Inland Empire of California, were planning on a combination of civil affairs and selective, combat patrols to continue General Mattis’ guidance of “No Better Friend, No Worse Enemy,” to which he had added, “First, Do No Harm” for Operation Iraqi Freedom 2. Now, with the combination of well publicized, hyper violence in Fallujah, and indecisive, contradictory orders from their own chain of command, the 1st Marine Division had basically been pulled into a branch plan of its original campaign plan for Operation Iraqi Freedom 2.

34 18’13.23” N 115 59’07.72” W elev 2260

0715 Hours Local GMT 31 March 2004

On the day that the horrible killing and mutilation of the 4 Blackwater USA contractors had started flashing across televisions and computer screens worldwide, LtCol Woodbridge and Sergeant Major Weiser had been observing the company attack of one of their 3 Rifle Companies down Range 400 aboard 29 Palms. Perched somewhere up above Machine Gun Hill, where the Company Commander inevitably placed most of his section of six M-240G machine guns, but below the spot that the snipers from the battalion Surveillance, Targeting and Acquisition (STA) platoon usually chose, LtCol Woodbridge watched Baker 1/7 conduct its attack. First, the Marines conducted a breach of an obstacle belt using a Bangalore torpedo. The massive explosion was followed, minutes later, by over 100 Marines running downrange in full combat gear. The Machine Gun platoon ran up the hill, emplacing 4 of their 6 guns in positions which had been sandbagged and surveyed to provide a measure of safety, because the guns would be firing over the heads of the infantry Marines running below them. Mortars from the Rifle Company light mortar section and the Battalion’s medium mortar section boomed in the distance.

Sergeant Major Weiser came up to Chris Woodbridge, who was taking it all in with a practiced eye – he had been a platoon commander, then a company commander in 1/7 in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and had run this very range himself in those billets several times. “Sir, I was talking to the Marines in 1st Platoon, they are cocky as hell.”

LtCol Woodbridge knew that, as he knew many of the individual personalities within his 1200 Marine command. He knew, for example, that one of the platoons in Suicide Charley Company, under 1stLt Davis, had three of the best squad leaders in the battalion, including Sergeant Owens, an exceptional small unit leader that had excelled in leading combat patrols in Najaf last year. Above the Battalion Commander and Sergeant Major, the snipers had already been at work with their M-40A3 7.62mm and M-82A1 .50cal rifles. The team of 4 snipers, under the watchful eye of their platoon sergeant, had been methodically calling in fire from the mortars on the simulated targets, shifting fire to the deeper targets, then shifting fire East, as the attack progressed.

As the first assault platoons went downrange, .50 cal fire from the Battalion’s heavy weapons platoon added to the supporting fires, nailing specific targets with precise bursts of armor piercing incendiary rounds which flashed bright silver in the morning light. A Javelin Missile team from the Battalion medium anti armor platoon ran forward to a spot next to Machine Gun hill, set up under the watchful eye of an exercise controller, and prepared to take several shots with the weapon that could reach out over a 1000 meters. But, for various technical reasons, the Javelin team failed to fire their missile. Meanwhile, the lead assault platoon encountered another wire obstacle, which they breached by using an APOD, man portable breaching rocket which towed a string of plastic explosive balls behind it as it arced over the simulated wire belt. The mini shock wave of the explosion reached up to the hillside.

As the lead assault platoon pushed through the breach created by the APOD, LtCol Woodbridge watched the progress. At the same time, Col Tucker, commanding officer of 7th Marine Regiment walked up to Machine Gun Hill and greeted LtCol Woodbridge. Col Tucker watched the machine guns teams at work, fully aware that the proficiency of these teams 3 or 4 levels below him in the chain of command could play a decisive role in the Small Wars types of operations which his 7000-Marine Regiment was conducting. As he watched the Corporals and Sergeants distribute belts of 7.62 mm ammunition under the watchful eyes of the exercise controllers from TEECG – the Tactical Exercise Control Group — Col Tucker had another item fresh on his mind – the killing of the 4 Blackwater contractors on this, the last day of March, 2004. He knew that his immediate senior, Major General Mattis, had just returned to Iraq, and was just getting acclimated to the new environment in Al Anbar Province. Col Tucker had seen the reports of the gruesome killings in the news this morning. He wondered how this would affect the Division’s campaign plan.

“Good Morning, Sir” – LtCol Woodbridge greeted his reporting senior as the attack progressed.

“Hi Chris, how are you?”

“Great, Sir. Baker Company going through this morning. The Company Commander is all over the place, trying to coach all of his platoons, really maximizing the training value of the exercise. We’re pretty familiar with Range 400, as you know.”

“Of course,” said Col Tucker, whose regimental headquarters was just across the central parade deck at 29 Palms from 1/7. 7th Marines, one of three Regiments in the 1st Marine Division, had the dubious benefit of being stationed out here in the middle of the Marine Corps’ largest base, smack dab in the middle of the Mojave Desert. Most battalions in the Marine Corps came through 29 Palms at least once every two years in their normal pre-deployment combined arms exercise. But the four infantry battalions in 7th Marines, along with 3d Light Armored Recon, and 1st Tanks, had the questionable fortune of being permanently stationed out here in the Stumps. The three rifle companies in 1/7 could just walk over the hill for three hours and they could run through the Range 400 series as much as they wanted.

“Chris, there’s been a pretty violent incident in Fallujah. The insurgents strung up 4 contractors, Americans, from a bridge, after burning the bodies to a crisp. I’ve seen the pictures in the morning press. It’s pretty disgusting. The question is how this affects the Division and the MEF’s plan.”

“Yessir, I saw the reports,” said LtCol Woodbridge, as a SMAW rocket from one of the assault teams attached to one of the lead assault platoons scored a direct hit on a stack of tires, setting the target ablaze. A sooty, oily smoke would emanate from the point of the direct hit for the rest of the exercise. LtCol Woodbridge scanned the lead platoon using his binoculars, while he continued to talk to his Regimental Commander. He had to admire the work of the SMAW gunner, and made a mental note to find out the Marine’s name. Always multitasking, Chris Woodbridge pulled out a Blackberry device, and scrolled through the emails in his account, while noting the SMAW gunner’s accuracy to Sergeant Major Weiser.

Col Tucker bantered on about the potential implications of the Fallujah incident with LtCol Woodbridge. Chris Woodbridge had a fine appreciation of the social and political nuance of the kind of Small Wars incidents that had dominated Operation Iraqi Freedom after the first 19 day March Up had toppled a symbolic statue in Fidros Square in a burst of maneuver warfare in March and early April, 2003. 1/7 had been one of the last infantry battalions in the 1st Marine Division to leave Iraq in September 2003, perhaps because it was General Mattis’ old unit, perhaps because it was located in the middle of Najaf, with its crucial effect on the regional stability of the Shiite dominated South. In any event, those 4 months in Najaf had taught Chris Woodbridge, and the other key Marines in 1/7 crucial, real world lessons in leading a battalion, company, platoons, and squads that were many times more valuable than all of the books and courses in their careers combined. LtCol Woodbridge, for example, learned the nuance of local economic forces – Najaf, for example, was completely isolated from the vagaries of the oil economy because of the revenue producing potential of religious tourism generated by the Grand Ali Mosque and adjacent massive, ancient graveyard in Najaf. In those few months of the Summer and Fall 2003, LtCol Woodbridge had inherited a well developed Stability Plan from his predecessor, now-Colonel Conlin, but he had executed in a flexible and intelligent manner as an assassination in the Mosque threatened to destabilize the Holy City.

LtCol Woodbridge’s Marines, too, had adapted. In a few short minutes time, the Marines in his vehicle born CAAT (Combined Anti Armor Team) platoon would go from the relatively impoverished Al Kufa neighborhood, and its lesser mosque where the so called “upstart,” “firebrand” cleric Moqtada Al Sadr preached, to the Grand Ali Mosque, where the Ayatollah Ali Sistani exerted his considerable power based on his over 70 years of painstaking Islamic religious scholarship. LtCol Woodbridge’s seniors had not lost sight of his deft handling of these complex, difficult circumstances.

Now, on a morning in late March 2004, Col Tucker conferred with LtCol Woodbridge, one of his battalion commanders, in order to put some context to the killing of the Blackwater contractors. In judo, or martial arts, it was a well known tactic of the weak to use the momentum or strength of the stronger opponent against him. Were the insurgents deliberately attempting to pull the Marines out of their battle plan? General Mattis’ admonition to be “no better friend, no worse enemy” had become famous in the 12 months after the stunning success of Operation Iraqi Freedom. The wave tactics, no Oakleys, ice water for the protestors, patrolling without body armor and helmets had become grist for Wall Street Journal editorials and NewsHour interviews. What did Sun Tzu say – attack your opponents plan? Were the insurgents deliberately trying to kill Marines, kill as many aid workers and reporters, and other CPA agents as possible? From 10,000 miles away, as the Marines of Baker Company methodically reduced the last of the bunker obstacles with precise fire from AT-4 rockets and M-203 40mm grenades, it sure seemed like the enemy was a thinking, planning, reacting foe, fully capable of adapting to the situation. Col Tucker’s reaction to the pictures of the corpses dangling from the bridges was the same as any Marines – the bastards, let’s hunt them down and kill them.

At the same time, Col Tucker screened his emotions through over two decades of professional education, as did the officers above him in the chain of command, to include Lieutenant General Conway, the Commanding General of the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force, just now taking charge of Al Anbar Province. This is exactly what they want us to do. Maybe the better thing to do is to wait, so as not to be seen as reacting.

Out in Al Anbar Province, Major General Mattis was touring Abu Gharaib Prison, which would become the focus of a media frenzy in a few short months on that day in late March 2004, when he first received word of the grisly killing of the Blackwater USA contractors in Fallujah. It was not an exceptional event, from the point of view of General Mattis, just the latest in a series of similar events which were, unfortunately, part of a bigger pattern of violence designed to separate American military and economic power from the power of economic development, education, and the spread of democracy and economic freedom. Col John Toolan, who commanded the 1st Marine Regiment, just now setting up for operations outside of Fallujah, monitored the same events with concern.

But here, atop Machine Gun Hill, LtCol Woodbridge didn’t give the killing of the Blackwater contractors special significance at first glance. 700 meters downrange, the last of the objectives was under intense fire from a platoon of Marines, who suppressed a bunker with small arms and 40mm grenades, while a SMAW and AT-4 rockets hit targets with pinpoint accuracy. This was almost 2 hours after the assault had been initiated with a Bangalore torpedo blasting a hole in the obstacle belt to start the attack. The units maneuvering downrange had displayed extremely good fire discipline throughout the exercise, from the battalion level down through the company and platoon level. Rather than rush through the exercise, or let it taper off anti climactically at the end as many units on this Range were tempted to do, this Company, under the detail oriented leadership of a very experienced Captain, had used the training exercise to extract every bit of training value out of every last engagement of every weapon system, beginning with the Battalion heavy machine guns and Battalion-level snipers who initiated the exercise, down to the last fire team that suppressed a bunker so that an AT-4 anti tank rocket could decisively end it. The Combined Arms Exercise, or CAX, had been modified significantly from its mid 1990s variation, which was heavy on large mechanized formations of tank and tank-infantry companies running down the long swaths of 29 Palms, like Delta Corridor out into the Blacktop at the far Northern edge of the base, sometimes accompanied by support from national level assets, such as B-1B heavy bombers, which started to show up at 29 Palms after the Cold War ended, and close air support looked like a viable mission for aircraft originally designed to penetrate Soviet airspace on missions to deliver nuclear weapons.

Now, in preparation for OIF2, the CAX was dominated by the small unit infantry skills that the units could expect in Afghanistan and Iraq. The exercise was shortened considerably, from 4 weeks to 2 weeks. It was focused, and it was conjoined with the Stability and Support Operations (SASO) training package at March Air Force Base set up by the Project Metropolis Staff from the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab at Quantico, Virginia together with a detachment from Division Schools at the 1st Marine Division.

A few weeks after their abbreviated CAX in late March, 1/7 would head down the road to the SASO package at March Air Force Base in order to build on the basic infantry skills which they had sharpened out here in the desert ranges of 29 Palms.

After the last of the platoons from Baker Company, 1/7, finished their assault on Range 400, the key leaders – the company commander, the platoon commanders, the squad leaders, gathered on a hill in the middle of Range 400 to debrief the exercise. By this time, Col Tucker had left, enroute back to Mainside, 29 Palms in order to run through the myriad tasks of a Regimental Commander with at least one of his battalions attached to another Regiment in theater in Iraq, and quite possibly preparing to react to the events of the morning in Fallujah. 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, was out on the Syria-Iraq frontier, in the vicinity of Qaim and Husabayah. Meanwhile, LtCol Woodbridge and Sergeant Major Weiser joined the debrief in the hill at the middle of Range 400, which basically became a classroom for the assembled infantry Marines.

The tone of the debrief was matter of fact, and anticlimactic. The Company Commander of Baker Company could very easily have been one of the instructors from the exercise control group – his knowledge of this range, and almost every range at 29 Palms was just as detailed as the instructors. 1/7 was playing on its home turf here, unlike Marine Infantry Battalions from Camp Pendleton, Hawaii, or Camp Lejeune. Instead of injecting detailed commentary to the debrief, the instructor staff more or less watched and supported the Captain, as he essentially lead the debrief with his subordinate leaders. The Captain walked the dog through every step of the attack. He had slowed the tempo of the attack down and deliberately micromanaged the attack in a way that he would never do in actual combat. He had done this to maximize the value of the training not so much for himself and the cadre of experienced leaders who filled the billets of platoon commander, squad leaders, and weapons section leaders, but rather to maximize the value of the training for the most junior Marines who had joined Baker 1/7 since the Battalion returned from Iraq last year. This was, first and foremost, a training opportunity for these new Marines, and he wanted to maximize the value of the evolution for the junior leaders – the squad leaders and fire team leaders with newly promoted lance corporals, and Privates First Class just in from the Recruit Depots.

Throughout the battalion, from the Lieutenant Colonel who commanded the battalion on down to the PFCs who were on their way to command the fire teams and squads that made up the DNA of a Marine Infantry Battalion, the Marines with experience in Najaf from the Summer of 2003, were sifting through their hard won lessons learned to maximize the chances of their units to excel and win the next time that they deployed to Iraq. As the brutal images of those 4 burned bodies demonstrated, the battalion was preparing to deploy into an environment that was far different from the one that they expected.

34 13’51.09” N 116 03’21.31 W elev 1758 ft

Local GMT 31 March 2004

LtCol Woodbridge returned to his Battalion’s offices at Mainside after the debrief at Range 400 ended. The Marines from Baker Company would return to Mainside, too, where they would clean weapons and prepare for another precious weekend of liberty in the few months before the Battalion deployed to Iraq again.

31 59’ 44.95” N 44 19’07.61 E elev 178 ft

Local GMT 1 July 2003

LtCol Woodbridge thought back to the Summer of 2003 in Najaf, where he had first assumed command of 1/7. On his desk, sat a dog-eared copy of a book by Janet Wallach entitled, Janet Wallach, Desert Queen. One passage which Chris Woodbridge had highlighted in yellow read: “At Najaf, the situation was even worse. The city, a web of underground houses connected by tunnels, a malignant, fanatical place, drew her with its mystery and beauty. There, she wrote, the holy men sat in an atmosphere reeking of antiquity, so thick with the dust of ages that you can’t see through it – nor can they.”

LtCol Woodbridge’ predecessor, now-Col Conlin had commanded 1/7 through the assault up to Bagdahd, and had set the structure of the stability operations which 1/7 was conducting in Najaf. LtCol Woodbridge, fresh from a staff assignment with the MEF, checked aboard the Battalion in June 2003. Every Thursday, the Battalion conducted a battalion level operation, which became known as the “battle of the mosques.” Essentially, Moqtada Al Sadr, a relatively young Shiite cleric in his early 30s incited his congregation in the Kufa Mosque to conduct a protest from East to West along the central East-West route in Najaf connecting the Imam Ali Mosque with the Kufa Mosque, which was known to the Marines as “Route Lu Lu.”

The two mosques did not get along for a combination of religious and socioeconomic reasons. As the seat of power for the Shiite faith, the Imam Ali Mosque was the larger and more prominent of the two mosques in Najaf/ Kufa, and the richer of the two. From a stack of maps and OpOrders next to his desk that he had accumulated during Operation Iraqi Freedom 1, Chris Woodbridge pulled a detailed 1:15,000 map of Najaf prepared by the 1st Marine Division Intelligence Section. The cemetery adjacent to the Imam Ali Shrine occupied the sum of perhaps 5 grid squares – each square representing an area 1000 meters by 1000 meters, or a square kilometer, or “klick” in military-speak. Chris Woodbridge traced his finger over the vast area of the black colored cemetery. The cemetery and the Imam Ali Mosque were among the most holy sites in the Shiite Sect of Islam. Pilgrims in that part of the Muslim faith were obligated to visit this site if they could in their adult lifetimes. These pilgrims, like tourists everywhere, would spend money – thus assuring the site of economic viability without regard to whether the rest of the economy functioned or not.

Chris Woodbridge traced the smaller circumference of the perimeter of the Imam Ali Shrine with his index finger as he recalled the rude awakening to internecine, religious rivalry which had erupted not long after he became the Battalion Commander of 1/7.

The Sergeant Major came into LtCol Woodbridge’s office, which was framed, like most Marine Commanding Officers, by a pair of flags – the American, and the Marine Corps. His combat gear – helmet and advanced body armor hung on a frame, and Janet Wallach’s Desert Queen — which he had highlighted liberally, particularly the sections on Najaf – sat on a table. “Sir, here are the Non Judicial Punishments for the week.”

Chris Woodbridge worked through the cases, which would be adjudicated by him together with his senior commanders with input from the Staff Non Commissioned Officers tomorrow afternoon, after the last Rifle Company ran through Range 400. After this distraction, he returned to the 1:15,000 map which occupied his attention at the moment.

Shortly after LtCol Woodbridge assumed command, one of the followers of Al Sistani was killed through a bombing by the followers of the rival Moqtada Al Sadr from the Kufa Mosque. The clerics who preached under the authority of Al Sistani at the Imam Ali Mosque were of higher prominence – like the Cardinals at the Vatican who might be eyed jealously by a local parish priest in Rome, trying to compete for legitimacy with the Pope through a series of fiery sermons.

At first, 1/7 took a neutral position towards the obvious rivalry between the two religious centers. Every Friday, the battalion engaged in the standard battle drill – it wasn’t really a battle, was it? – which was centered around the key positions of forces in order to respond to the potential for mass demonstrations coming out of the Kufa Mosque where Sadr gave his sermons and fatwas. Every Muslim prays five times a day, regardless of the circumstances, but one day a week is set aside for public prayer. That public prayer usually occurs at one of the larger mosques, and following after the prayer, it is traditional for one of the Imams, or his clerics of a lesser rank, to give some form of sermon. The sermon usually centers on how to live a righteous life. The fatwas concern what a good Muslim needs to do, usually answering some form of question. The fatwa is a religious answer to the question that the religious leader poses. It is always topical and in the form of a question, like “What should we do as good Muslims?”

On one of these Friday afternoons, as 1/7 was executing its battle drill to stabilize the crowd during the post fatwa protest march, a massive vehicle bomb killed Bakir Al Hakim, one of Sistani’s most important subordinate clerics, and killed or injured about one hundred other people in the shrine. 1/7 not only had to react to the immediate fallout from the bombing – the mass casualty drill at the hospital, requiring 1/7 to augment the medical staff there – but the battalion also had to prepare for the massive funeral procession which followed within a week for the prominent cleric, who was connected to SCIRI, the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq. LtCol Woodbridge ran through the so-called Commander’s Critical Intelligence Requirements – the CCIRs of this little episode: Who was going to attend the funeral? What are our responsibilities for security? Where do we link up with VIPs? What route do we take to get them to the Shrine area? What is our course of action for the battalion and coalition forces during in Najaf during the funeral?

Chris Woodbridge ran a finger over the map spread out on his desk, and he could imagine 1st Marine Regiment – Colonel John A. Toolan – and the Division and MEF Staff out in Camp Fallujah at this very moment going through a similar crisis response drill. They could, of course, locate down to the meter the exact bridge where those contractors had been strung up – lynched – like obscene piñatas on a bridge trestle. Those were Americans, by God – SEALS and Special Forces troopers. One former SEAL had been quite a local character down in San Diego. 1st Marines was just getting on the deck there in Al Anbar, and the insurgents had clearly greeted the Marines with a round of extreme violence designed to elicit an emotional response.

Unlike the funeral exercise last summer in Najaf last summer in 2003, this new challenge seemed less likely to be contained and downplayed, even though the absolute number of casualties was much smaller in the latest Fallujah violence. It was all a matter of perception, really. Four dead American contractors graphically slain and strung up could impact the world media network more powerfully than 100 Muslim worshippers in the Imam Ali Mosque – it was a function of the pictures and sounds that emanated from the event. It was pure information operations, or IO, as the Marine and military Staffs put it. Within the first few weeks on the ground, the Marines had lost the initiative in the IO campaign. Instead of getting the word out about the great civil affairs ops that they could offer to the population – to be “no better friend” – the newly arriving Marines had been greeted with a media event that they could not minimize, contain, or downplay.

Chris Woodbridge thought back to the funeral exercise last summer. During the funeral, 1/7 did not provide any security escort for the funeral procession as a whole, though they did provide security for some of the individual delegates coming down from Bagdahd. Chris Woodbridge traced the route from Route 9 to Route Lu Lu, bisecting the city of Kufa/ Najaf. He recalled the three circles of security which had been provided for the event, the outermost of which was the responsibility of 1/7, the innermost of which was the responsibility of Sistani’s closest followers. These local militias, originally formed for local security for this cataclysmic event, mutated into the more robust local militias which were active today in Najaf. There was a law of unintended consequences at work here – pure chaos theory: The fluttering of the wings of a butterfly in one hemisphere causes, through untraceable causes and effects, a hurricane in the next hemisphere weeks later. 1/7 had task organized with considerable outside attachments – a shock trauma platoon, a truck platoon, civil affairs Marines, Army psychological operations troops, an Army MP company, even a Puerto Rican MP unit that turned out to be worthless. Chris Woodbridge, could, in his mind’s eye, trained through the best schools that the Marines offered, see the exact same drill happening now in the coming days in Camp Fallujah. Where would the law of unintended consequences dictate that events flowed in Fallujah in the coming days?

The major difference between the Najaf funeral exercise last summer and the current Fallujah event was that the Marines had reasserted control and initiative over the situation after the massive truck bomb killed that prominent Muslim cleric. Now, Chris Woodbridge was concerned that the judo push-pull of information operations favored the insurgents. The insurgents had pushed alright. What reaction would be forthcoming?

[Section 11, 12, 13]

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[Section 14, 15]

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39 10’47.1″ N 76 40’2.1″W elevation 43 meters Baltimore Washington International Airport
Local GMT 4 April 2004

Staff Sergeant Matt Carpenter was delayed enroute to Kuwait. Lost Bags. You’ve gotta be shitting me, a frustrated Carpenter cursed the system. His grandfather had been a US Navy Sea Bee with service in the Marine Pacific Campaigns. His grandfather’s friends were US Marine veterans of World War II. Carpenter visited his kin in the Pennsylvania of his youth during the delay.

One of his neighbors, Harold Codger had been an influential role model from an early age. “Every deployment I had been on, Harold had always sent me a letter, wishing me well. Every Marine Corps birthday I was in the states, I would always call Harold. I saw Harold on the 15th or 16th [of April]. I flew out the next day.”

...,1st Draft

Chapter 13 – Training for Ramadi 101 Feb

Chapter 13 — Training for Ramadi 1
 
33 48’04.60″N 42 25’53.80″E elev 168m  Al Asad Logistics Hub, Iraq
1500 Hours Local 19 Sept 2004
 
The training for the Ramadi 2005-06 (“Ramadi 1″ in Lima 3/7′s history) began on the last day of the Husaybah deployment in 2004, when Captain Rory Quinn took command of the company from Captain Neal.
 
LtCol Lopez made the decision to put Captain Quinn in command, in part because Captain Neal was overdue for a change of station to a “b-billet” or non-Fleet Marine Force tour of duty. However, the decision by LtCol Lopez also reflected his willingness to do the unorthodox. LtCol Lopez was not one to stand on tradition. He had conducted promotion ceremonies on the back of Harley Davidson motorcycles, which was a common cultural bond that unified Enlisted and Officer ranks alike.  Tradition would have dictated that he wait to replace Captain Neal until after returning to the United States, possibly allowing a wife or family member of the new Commanding Officer to witness the ceremony. But Lopez needed to move Captain Neal on to another tour, and — more importantly — he wanted to give the incoming Lima Commanding Officer as much time as possible, and as much credibility as possible, in front of his Marines. LtCol Lopez decision to put Captain Quinn in command gave him instant credibility with the Marines because they saw that he was in Iraq with them.
 
In the hanger, Lima 3/7 went through a rite of passage — a change of command.  The Marines of Lima 3/7 stood at attention in the logistics hub, on their last day in Iraq, arrayed in 4 platoons. Captain Neal took the guidon from First Sergeant Calderon, pivoted and handed the emblem of the unit to his replacement, Captain Rory Quinn, who had joined the 3/7 S-3 Shop midway through the deployment to Al Qaim. 
 
“Col Lopez didn’t give a hoot about anything unless he thought about it and agreed with it,” recalled Captain Quinn in 2008. “He wanted me to take command in Iraq… got me credibility with the Marines. By the time my peers took command [of their rifle companies], it was November 17, two months later, so it had practical benefits.” 
 
“The principle I am getting at,” went on Rory Quinn recalling the change of command, “is question all assumptions. That sounds [like] bad discipline or counter cultural or whatever. I think you need to be counter-cultural if your culture is 3d Generation. Some assumptions you are going to question and find them valid. But other assumptions, like change of command on certain days, is not valid.” The authors had asked Major Quinn to identify the best topics that illustrated the shift from 3d to 4th Generation Warfare.
 
34 13’59.94″ N 116 03’20.01″ W elev 561 Lima Company Offices, 29 Palms, CA
1500 Hours 13 July 2005
 
The Lima Marines had just come back from a month of “max leave” after the Husaybah deployment and went to the Marine Corps Birthday Ball on 10 November 2005. Captain Quinn knew that he had what the Marines call a “leadership challenge” on his hands. Captain Quinn’s response to this challenge was to consciously address the “counterculture” and bitterness among the Marines in the wake of bad tactics by labeling the company, “Luscious Lima.” The Marines knew that the tactics that they had been using in Qaim were screwed up. They had been walking down streets on “IED sweeps,” which — in practical terms — meant that they were walking patrols to trigger IEDs. 
 
“I could sense, leaving Husaybah leaving the Al Qaim deployment, that the Marines were very, very bitter. They were bitter because they were practicing tactics that they didn’t believe in, and they knew to be stupid, but none of us at that time could put our hands on what the right tactic was,” recalls Rory Quinn. “A quick example is, the counterinsurgency doctrine talks about the necessity to get out in town and maintain coverage in town. So, we would, literally, from the regiment — I can say this because I was in the operations shop — we would be required to report, graphically, how many hours per day we had achieved patrols. The goal was at any point, I should be able to look at a timeline on top, and as I go down the timeline I should see multiple bars, meaning at any hour of the day, I had multiple patrols out in town. Practically what that turned into was Marines just walked around until IEDs blew up, and that was called an ‘IED Sweep.’ Now, clearly, that’s not what LtCol Lopez ordered, but there is a great challenge between what you say and how it plays out. And LtCol Lopez was always out the gate [our in town, in operations with his Marines]. Well you need to be because you need to see how that plays out.”
 
“So, despite [LtCol Lopez'] talents, despite our flexibility, Al Qaim was just a tough deployment, the Sunnis ‘just had to fight.’ And we were on the beginning of the bow-wave, and relatively little of Mainz’ [2007 Augmentation Team/ Joint Security Station/ Distributed Operations] tactics would have worked then.”
 
As the authors listened to Rory Quinn say, the Sunnis “just had to fight,” they were impressed by the high degree of objectivity, detachment, and professionalism that this statement indicates. Under the heading of “just having to fight,” Rory Quinn would have witnessed a number of deaths and traumatic injuries of his Lima Marines in the previous Husaybah deployment, as well as in the upcoming Ramadi 1 Deployment.
 
Captain Quinn responded to the enduring bitterness of the 2004 Al Qaim deployment by promoting a certain counter culture, embodied best by the company’s new self-styled title, “Luscious Lima.” On the flight back, and in the weeks that followed back at 29 Palms, Captain Quinn asked his leadership to come up with ways to address the bitterness that lingered because of the deaths and injuries of so many Lima Marines.
 
“Coming off the deployment, that is hard to deal with,” Quinn went on. “So, the Marines are really bitter. There have been a lot of Marines hurt, killed, basically for no good reason in the Marines’ opinion. The situation hadn’t changed. They don’t understand that we’re only a third of the way through the fight period when the ‘virgin opportunity’ [to conduct greater civil military operations tactics in a more permissive environment] will present itself again. I realized that I needed to do something to show that I wasn’t just a robotic thinker. So, ‘Lightinng Lima,’ [which the Company had used when the authors served in the company], ‘Lucky Lima’ — what name are you going to use for your company? Well, I challenged guys to think of a different one.”
 
Quinn remembers, “And Gunnery Sergeant Carpenter [the 1st Platoon Commander during the Husaybah deployment] came up with ‘Luscious’ and he said it as a joke thinking that no one would ever take him up on it.” Gunnery Sergeant Carpenter had vehemently criticized higher echelons in his after action report, stating that no unit “since Valley Forge” had been more under equipped than Lima 3/7 going back into the Al Qaim deployment due to the lack of SMAW thermobaric rockets and grenades — “orbs of destruction” he called them. But, it was Gunny Carpenter, who commanded 1st Platoon, who coined the term, “Luscious Lima” and associated it with the Rolling Stone lips.
 
“There would have to be some masculine aspect to it because ‘Luscious’ is too feminine,” recalls Quinn. “But if we could do this, it would be totally counter cultural. I said to the Marines, ‘I will not send you on an IED sweep, but I may need you to go clear a particular area one time if a VIP is coming through. We were close. And then, we tried to think, ‘what could we use to represent it?’ We needed something masculine. Then Gunny Carp comes up with the Rolling Stone lips, which even though they are lips, it’s the Rolling Stones, that’s kind of ass, there are things that can appeal to a man… Beast of Burden. We went with it.”
 
Now there’s a image that can be both counter cultural and masculine, decided Rory Quinn. If its good enough for Mick Jagger, then it is good enough for a 19 year old Marine Lance Corporal. Not only did Captain Quinn embrace the image, as the Commanding Officer, but he had the image drawn on the walls in the Lima Company spaces in spray paint in the irreverent “tagger” style of spray-paint wielding, street artists. “I had one of my Marines tag it,” recalls Quinn. “That’s not really going to sit well in the Battalion. I told Colonel Lopez what I was doing. I don’t think he really dug it, but he didn’t negate it. I know some people didn’t like it, Sergeant Major [the senior enlisted Marine in the Battalion.]”
 
Rather than fight the resentment brewing among the Qaim veterans in his company, Rory Quinn had the genius to embrace their counter cultural dissatisfaction. “I will not an IED sweep,” was the deeper message that Captain Quinn sought to convey. He had to show that he was not a linear thinker. 
 
For his part, Gunny Vegh — a school trained Scout Sniper, who had had much more input into the operations of the Company than his billet would dictate — also embraced the moniker, Luscious Lima. When Janar Wasito interviewed Gunny Vegh in 2005, the Gunny explained that the concept of Luscious Lima grew out of Captain Gannon’s dry sense of humor. Gannon would joke around about red licorice sticks being “crack,” as in the cocaine-derivative drug. Vegh recalled Gannon offering senior officers, like LtCol Lopez some red licorice during a briefing in early 2004, asking, “Hey sir, do you want some crack?” “You had to know Captain Gannon. For him, that was a funny,” said Vegh. For Vegh, Luscious Lima stood for the idea that under the stress of combat, it was important — even imperative — to keep a sense of humor, to not take oneself too seriously, and that one would even tend to make better decisions if one kept a sense of humor. Luscious Lima was a good fit with Vegh’s personality. Quinn remembers, “That’s right up Gunny Vegh’s alley. Gunny Vegh runs in sandals because, ‘if it’s good enough for the Lord, it’s good enough for me.’ On Battalion runs, one of the worst ass chewings I ever got from LtCol Lopez was… I guess Vegh had done this historically, [but] from my perspective, this was the first time I had ever seen this. But Colonel Lopez had addressed this in months past. And when Gunny Vegh went running in Teva sandals, man Colonel Lopez chewed his ass and then chewed my ass for poor discipline and lack of uniformity. On a Battalion run[the uniform was] green [shirt] on green [shorts] with PT [running] shoes.”
 
But, Captain Quinn let it pass. Gunny Vegh could be both a disciplinarian and countercultural at the same time. “Gunny could be very disciplinarian — let’s call that 3d Generation — but he also had a significant component of his personality where he could view things in a different light. And so, he started to dig the Luscious Lima thing. We would start to play football on Fridays, [or do Fartlek runs] or do things that were not just running. It created a sense in the company that we didn’t have to do anything. We thought about everything. We picked what we wanted to do, because it’s militarily efficient. We’re not actually Rolling Stones, right, but in a Rolling Stones sort of way, we would be very military efficient and proficient. That was the best of both worlds for us.”
 
For Captain Quinn, the manifestations of a counter culture — Luscious Lima, one of his senior enlisted leaders sometimes running in sandals in solidarity with Jesus Christ — were welcome elements of a necessary tension with the established Marine Corps superstructure of rigid discipline. In a sense, Quinn saw these as part of the imperative of leadership in the 4th Generation of Warfare. Notably, Rory Quinn’s story about the origins of “Luscious Lima” came up in response to an open ended question from the authors: “We are looking for evidence that the Marine Corps and Lima 3/7 made the transition from 3d Generation to 4th Generation Warfare. What topics would you pick to illustrate this transition?” After an hour-long interview discussing the elements of 3d Generation Warfare that apply to the 4th Generation, we were winding down and talking informally. Rory Quinn started to recall the origins of “Luscious Lima” and discussed how the transition from 3d to 4th Generation requires a certain “counterculture.” We turned our camera back on as Rory Quinn traced back through the origins of Luscious Lima.
 
Luscious Lima was an image that the authors had noted when they interviewed Gunny Sandor Vegh in 2005 between the Husaybah and Ramadi 1 deployments. Gunny Vegh kept stressing the importance of Luscious Lima, not as a sign of disrespect for higher authority, but rather as a symbol that stood for something bigger than itself — the ability to maintain a sense of humor in the middle of enormous stress, a quality that Vegh admired in Captain Gannon.
 
Moreover, Quinn sought other ways to break down the walls between officer and enlisted. Towards this end, Quinn would take off his blouse as much as possible. “Let me take a leap. Here’s a concept. Don’t take yourself too seriously, especially if you are a Captain. The Marines perceive you as completely different from them, until you start to break down walls. This is a big imperative of leadership, especially in the 4th Generation because we break down these walls, you show some humor, you go out and do the runs with the Marines, you do the combat endurance test with them, you do the Fartlek course with them. I would take my blouse off a lot so that the rank wasn’t on my collar because I wanted the Marines to see me as a man, not as a Captain. That fit with the Luscious Lima thing… You can’t go too far…”
 
 
Quinn went on: “But what I can trace forward, to Ramadi 2 [Lima’s 2007 Ramadi deployment] the ‘Ghost Post’ [which Sergeant Mejia put in place] was an unconventional tactic. Well, that derived from Luscious — being able to question assumptions, and come up with your own ways of thinking lead Mejia to come up with that tactic. Well, when we fast forward to Ramadi 2, we’re talking about victory. In Ramadi 2 as we are winning, as the Battalion XO, I am going to people’s houses, important people who we knew from Ramadi 1. I was having tea with them in their house while the Marines are posting security outside. In that scenario, you have to be perceived as a Rifleman to the Marines. I mean, you are never a Rifleman [which is normally the rank of Private First Class or Lance Corporal] because you are a Major. If it made them nervous to be around me, it would be disasterous. Because what we are doing is already different enough. [The Marines] have to post security, but not so close that it makes the tea environment anti social. So, they already have a difficult enough challenge. If now, when I say to them, ‘just go a little further outside, don’t look in here,’ [the Marine] can probably figure, ‘Oh, [Major Quinn] is intimidating enough.’ If I have always been a Major to him, if I have always been a commander, it has costs that make it hard to win the counter insurgency battle.”
 
But, at the same time, Quinn had to maintain enough social distance and authority as a commander, so that in a fire fight, he could command instant obedience to orders from his Marines. “But of the two skills,” summarizes Quinn, “that one [getting instant obedience to orders] comes easier. [Marines] leave boot camp with that understanding. There is a degree of breaking down barriers that is more important in the socially centric, network centric [writing] of Hammes [Quinn referring to Thomas Hammes’ publications on 4th Generation Warfare, which includes discussions of network centric warfare] nature of 4th Generation War, that something like ‘Luscious Lima’ or ‘Eco Challenge Echo [referring to Company E]’ or ‘Hiking Hotel Company [referring to Company H’ as in mountain hiking. All those things are military enough, but I call it civilian enough. Be a member of the United States society, but also a Marine.”
[Out in town], 29 Palms, CA
0300 Hours 13 Aug 2005

As authors, trying to piece together the internal dynamics of a 180-Marine unit, we relied on interviews, and collected data – pictures, documents in electronic form, etc. Sometimes, though, one works to get lucky. One such lucky break came in the form of a novel, based on the actual experiences of one of the Marines, Lt Luke Larson. Larson was described by Doug Halelpaska, who got to know Larson well as an embed in Ramadi, as one of those quiet individuals who always seems to have more going on intellectually than he may show at first on the surface. Just a few months after that second tour in Ramadi in 2007 – and a few weeks after Larson left the Marine Corps – he sent us a draft of his novel, Senator’s Son, which may yet become one of the classic fictional treatments of the Iraq War. It would be like a historian of Delta Company, 1/5, stumbling across James Webb in the early 1970s, and getting a second draft of Fields of Fire – which ultimately went through seven drafts — and perhaps using it as a source document. This introduction, then, applies to several stages in the rest of our book where we will use Larson’s novel as a source document.
Between the Husaybah deployment and the first Ramadi deployment, Lima Company picked up 3 new platoon commanders — 2nd Lieutenants Walt Larisy of Alabama, Matt Hendricks, and Luke Larson. In one of the early passages in his novel, Luke Larson describes the scene as the 3 Lieutenants are about to depart for Ramadi.
The following account is adapted from Luke Larson’s novel, Senator’s Son. The real names of the people are placed in square brackets.
On the morning of their deployment [Matt Hendricks] picked up [Walt Larisey] and drove to [Luke Larson]’s house. [Matt] had become very close friends with the other Lieutenants. He met [Luke Larson] at Officer Candidate School and they had attended The Basic School and Infantry Officer Course together in Quantico, Virginia. Coincidentally they ended up in Lima Company together. The truck’s headlights illuminated the driveway in the dark morning. A heavy wind blew sand and dust.
[Luke]’s wife [Kristen] stood in the driveway with her blonde hair blowing sideways from the weather. [Luke] grabbed his pack and sea bag and threw them in the back of the truck. [Kristen] walked to the door and tapped on the window. [Matt] rolled down the window to hear the wind whistling in the dark.
Her eyes glistened with tears as she looked in at [Walt] and [Matt].
“You boys be safe!” shouted [Kristen] over the sound of the gusts of air.
“And please take care of [Luke]!”
Her lip quivered as she finished her sentence.
“We’ll be all right hun,” replied [Walt].
“[Luke] will be taking care of us,” yelled [Matt].
[Kristen] gave her husband one last hug and kiss. They held each other tight for the final moment as wind blew around them. He whispered something in her ear and jumped in the truck.
[Luke] looked out the window at his young wife waving. As they drove away, she disappeared into the night. The truck remained silent.
“Put some music on,” said [Walt].
[Luke] rummaged through the glove box and found a Celine Dion CD.
“What the fuck is this?”
“I took Amy to go see a Celine Dion concert in Las Vegas last weekend,” said [Matt], wincing in anticipation of the ball busting about to occur.
“We sat front row and it cost me $1500, so I bought the CD.”
“Right,” said [Walt] as he nursed an enormous dip.
“Well we should at least listen to it I guess,” joked [Luke].
[Matt] fully expected one of the other lieutenants to change the CD after the song started. No one did and the song played on. As the music started to build, [Matt] burst out the words-
“I drove all ni—ght, to get to you. Is that all ri–ght I drove all night…”
[Luke] and [Walt] looked at each other and smiled. In no time the truck filled with the volume of the three infantry lieutenants as they busted out Celine Dion at the top of their lungs.
“I drove all ni—ght, to get to you. Is that all ri–ght I drove all night…”

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